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Reining in Private Agents
†

Amitai Etzioni

The Constitution and much of statutory law seek to protect
individual rights from intrusions by the government. It is the
government’s coercive power that must be constrained. In contrast, private agents are assumed by most Americans to engage
in voluntary transactions, transactions that are mutually bene1
ficial as well as serve the common good. Thus, major segments
of Western political and social philosophy, public disclosure,
and policymaking hold the private sector to be basically the
realm of freedom—and the government as the power that needs
to be checked and reined in. However, this Article presents evidence that at least in three major areas, the said restraints on
governmental power are circumvented, on a very large scale, by
private agents carrying out—for the government—activities
that government is banned from undertaking. These areas concern surveillance, policing, and military interventions overseas.
The question hence arises: what suggested remedies can correct
this major challenge to the basic conception that underlies the
Constitution and the rule of law? After reviewing several remedies, this Article asks whether a more profound reconceptualization is called for.
This Article begins with a discussion of Americans’ privacy
rights under the Constitution and current legislation before
turning to a discussion of the private sector’s largely unregulated collection of personal data and potential remedies to address related privacy concerns in Part I. Next, Part II covers
the widespread use of private police and their lack of accountability, and then discusses the implications for public safety and
the effectiveness of proposed reforms. Finally, Part III focuses
on the U.S. government’s reliance on private military contractors for overseas missions and the significant problems stemming from their lack of accountability, as well as the implica† University Professor and Professor of International Affairs at The
George Washington University. Copyright © 2016 by Amitai Etzioni.
1. Moreover, private agents can be limited through civil suits.
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tions of their use for foreign policy. An overview and discussion
of remedies follows.
I. PRIVACY MERCHANTS
The right to privacy, like other rights, is first and foremost
a right “against” the government. It protects Americans from
2
undue intrusions by the state. The first right to federal privacy
was formulated in the mid-1960s. This right limited the power
of the government to interfere in the reproductive choices of
3
couples and women (i.e., decisional privacy). Several laws have
further limited the information the government may collect.
Particularly important among these is the Privacy Act of 1974,
which restricts government agencies, including the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), Social Security Administration, and
Medicare, from sharing with third parties the personal infor4
mation they collect on individuals without their consent. The
Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 requires a warrant or
court order for police to access a consumer’s video rental records, and the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 limits disclosure of personal information obtained by the state in connec5
The
Electronic
tion
with
motor
vehicle
records.
Communications Privacy Act strictly limits phone wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping, except for law enforcement purposes, in which case a warrant or subpoena is required for gov6
ernment access to emails. The National Security Act of 1947
and subsequent legislation following the intelligence scandals
of the 1970s bans the National Security Agency (NSA) and
2. True, an oft-cited article by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis conceived of privacy as a right to be let alone, mainly from the press; however,
this was a law review article, not the law of the land. See Samuel D. Warren &
Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
3. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1974).
5. Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (1994); Video
Privacy Protection Act of 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (1988).
6. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508,
100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended in various sections of the United
States Code, such as 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (1986)); see also Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., https://epic.org/privacy/
ecpa (last visited Nov. 14, 2016) (“ECPA does include important provisions
that protect a person’s wire and electronic communications from being intercepted by another private individual. In general, the statute bars wiretapping
and electronic eavesdropping, possession of wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping equipment, and the use or disclosure of information unlawfully obtained through wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping.”).
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Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from spying on Americans in
the United States; what information about them the NSA does
hold in its computers, it may “read” only once it shows a court
that it has reason to suspect that the person is the agent of a
7
foreign power. Finally, the Right to Financial Privacy Act requires a subpoena for the government to access financial rec8
ords from a bank.
True, some laws limit the personal information that select
private parties can collect and share. For example, the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) includes
a Privacy Rule that limits access and sharing of personal medical information on the part of healthcare-related entities, both
9
in the government and private sectors. However, by and large,
Americans have rather limited privacy protections against private parties. Corporations may read the emails of employees
and listen to their phone calls, unless the terms of employment
commit them to act otherwise. Grounds for libel and defamation are much narrower in the United States than in other nations.
The Fourth Amendment also provides a major source of
privacy for individuals against government surveillance. This
Amendment affirms “[t]he right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures” as well as the requirement of “probable
10
cause” for a search warrant to be issued. The Supreme Court’s
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence limits how the government
can collect information for law enforcement purposes, generally
requiring a warrant for searches and seizures, but making exceptions for “exigent circumstances,” government “special
needs” and administrative searches, consent by the person
searched, “minimally intrusive” searches, and searches in the
11
absence of a “reasonable expectation of privacy.” These priva7. Two Sets of Rules for Surveillance, Within U.S. and on Foreign Soil,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/
two-sets-of-rules-for-surveillance.html?_r=0.
8. Christopher Slobogin, Transaction Surveillance by the Government, 75
MISS. L.J. 139, 162 (2005).
9. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/laws
-regulations (last visited Nov. 15, 2016).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. See, e.g., Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (on intrusiveness);
Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (on exigent circumstances); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (on expectations of privacy); New Jer-
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cy protections are enforced in part by the exclusionary rule,
which limits the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation
of the privacy doctrine, providing a disincentive for law enforcement to do so. After 9/11, the surveillance powers of the
government were greatly increased; however, these powers became subject to much concern, criticism, and reform, especially
after the Snowden revelations in 2013, and were amended with
12
the 2015 USA Freedom Act.
Less attention has been paid to the collection of personal
information by the private sector. Such collection increased
over the twenty-first century thanks to advances in information
technology, and continues to grow rapidly in terms of the quan13
tity, breadth, and dollar value of data collected. Broadly
speaking, there are two kinds of corporations that track the activities and backgrounds of Internet users. One category tracks
user activity on its sites in support of its regular business, such
as recording purchases and viewed products to help increase
sales. Though these corporations may sell personal data to advertisers or others, it is not their primary line of business. A second category has as its primary business the collection of personal information, often in the form of detailed dossiers, and
selling it in the marketplace to any and all comers. Such com14
panies, termed “data brokers” or “privacy merchants,” are the
focus of this section.
A. PRIVACY MERCHANTS: A MAJOR INDUSTRY
Privacy merchants, or data brokers, are defined by the
Federal Trade Commission as “companies that collect information, including personal information about consumers, from
a wide variety of sources for the purpose of reselling such information to their customers for various purposes, including
verifying an individual’s identity, differentiating records, marsey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (on special needs); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1972) (on consent); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967) (on expectations of privacy and attendant safeguards).
12. Sabrina Siddiqui, Congress Passes NSA Surveillance Reform in Vindication for Snowden, THE GUARDIAN (June 3, 2015), https://www.theguardian
.com/us-news/2015/jun/02/congress-surveillance-reform-edward-snowden.
13. See, e.g., Gil Press, 6 Predictions For The $125 Billion Big Data Analytics Market in 2015, FORBES (Dec. 11, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
gilpress/2014/12/11/6-predictions-for-the-125-billion-big-data-analytics-market
-in-2015/#1aafe71a2b20.
14. Amitai Etzioni, The Privacy Merchants: What Is To Be Done?, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 929, 930 (2012).
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keting products, and preventing financial fraud.” As of 2012,
one leading privacy merchant alone, Acxiom, maintained a database of over “500 million active consumers worldwide, with
about 1,500 data points per person,” including “a majority of
16
adults in the United States.” Though no comprehensive list of
privacy merchants exists, estimates of the number of companies active in this sector ranges from the hundreds to the thou17
sands. The industry generated $150 billion in revenue in
18
2012, compared to $75.4 billion for the U.S. Government’s
19
FY2012 Intelligence Budget.
Privacy merchants’ collection of consumer information is
not limited to publicly available information, such as home addresses and phone numbers. Collection extends to such specific
and private information as YouTube viewing habits, medical
conditions, pet ownership, income, social media activity, finan20
cial vulnerabilities, and many other kinds of information.
Although privacy merchants’ acts have not elicited the
same kind of alarm that surveillance by the government has
engendered, critics express concern about privacy violations
and call for greater regulation and transparency of these private actors. Some note that data brokers create lists of people
who are victims of sexual assault, or have specific health concerns. These critics argue that “many of the lists have no business being in the hands of retailers, bosses or banks” and that
“[w]e need regulation to help consumers recognize the perils of
21
the new information landscape . . . .”
15. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF
RAPID CHANGE 1, 68 (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
reports/federal-trade-commission-report-protecting-consumer-privacy-era
-rapid-change-recommendations/120326privacyreport.pdf.
16. Natasha Singer, Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer Genome, N.Y.
TIMES, June 6, 2012, at BU1.
17. GOV’T. ACCT. OFF., Information Resellers: Consumer Privacy Framework Needs To Reflect Changes in Technology and the Marketplace 1, 5 (2013),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/658151.pdf.
18. Press Release, Sen. Edward Markey, Markey, Rockefeller Introduce
Data Broker Bill To Ensure Accuracy, Accountability for Consumers (Feb. 12,
2014), http://www.markey.senate.gov/news/press-releases/markey-rockefeller
-introduce-data-broker-bill-to-ensure-accuracy-accountability-for-consumers.
19. Intelligence Budget Data, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, http://fas.org/irp/
budget (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
20. S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 113TH
CONG., A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND
SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR MARKETING PURPOSES ii (Dec. 18, 2013).
21. Frank Pasquale, The Dark Market for Personal Data, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/opinion/the-dark-market-for
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The American normative assumptions are that if one is an
innocent citizen, not suspected of anything, the government
will know very little about that person. And whatever information the government gathers about such people will be
locked into separate silos, not accessible to other government
agencies. In contrast, private corporations know a great deal
about people’s preferences and behaviors, and may (and do)
keep detailed dossiers on most Americans, although some areas
are carved out as protected, especially medical information and,
to a lesser extent, financial data.
B. PRIVACY MERCHANTS: WORKING FOR THE GOVERNMENT
Very little attention is paid to the fact that the distinction
between the government and the private sector—which uses information for commercial purposes to improve customer service
and make a profit—is increasingly meaningless. Privacy merchants sell the information they amass and process to the government. The difference between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) assembling detailed dossiers on most Americans
(which would shock many) versus simply purchasing such a
dossier from a company such as Acxiom and LexisNexis is increasingly trivial. The private data is but one check and one
click away from the government.
The U.S. government in general, and law enforcement
agencies in particular, have made substantial use of the ser22
vices provided by data privacy merchants since the 1990s.
23
One leading company, ChoicePoint, provided “services to 7000
24
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies” as of 2006.
These include “multimillion dollar contracts with at least thirty-five federal agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service
25
(IRS) and the FBI.” Privacy merchants provide services specifically tailored to law enforcement needs, offering to “identify a
subject’s neighbors, relatives and business associates” and “discern geographic or pathological patterns in criminal behav-

-personal-data.html.
22. See, e.g., Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How
ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your
Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595 (2004).
23. Choicepoint has since been rebranded “LexisNexis Risk Solutions” after its acquisition by Reed Elsevier.
24. Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 357, 362 (2006).
25. Id. at 363.
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ior.” In 2012, the U.S. Treasury Department began using the
Work Number database, which is owned by data broker
Equifax and includes data on “54 million active salary and employment records, and more than 175 million historical records”
from “more than 2,500 U.S. employers,” in order to determine
27
eligibility for government benefits and reduce fraud. Even before 9/11, “ChoicePoint and similar services ran between fourteen thousand and forty thousand searches per month for the
28
United States Marshals Service alone.”
“[C]ommercial data brokers have built massive data centers with personal information custom-tailored to law enforce29
ment agents,” and the FBI now holds “voluminous records
from commercial data collectors like Acxiom, ChoicePoint,” and
30
LexisNexis’s Accurint database. Accurint alone claims to be
used by “over 4,000 federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies across the country” and to have access to “over 34 bil31
lion public and proprietary records.” Likewise, findings indicate that “[f]ederal agencies have long evaded the privacy
standards in the Privacy Act of 1974 by using information from
32
commercial databases.”
C. PRIVACY MERCHANT ACTIVITIES ARE BASICALLY LEGAL
There are relatively few limits on personal information
privacy merchants can collect or disclose compared to those on
the government. One important limit on disclosure of private
information is the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) which restricts Consumer Reporting Agencies (CRAs) from disclosing
information except to third parties who have a “valid need.”
26. Nicole Duarte, Commercial Data Uses by Law Enforcement Raises
Questions About Accuracy, Oversight, NEWS21 (Aug. 16, 2006), http://news21
.com/story/2006/08/16/commercial_data_use_by_law.
27. Melanie Hicken, What Information Is the Government Buying About
You?, CNN MONEY (Oct. 30, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/10/30/pf/
government-data-broker.
28. Christopher Slobogin, Government Data Mining and the Fourth
Amendment, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 317, 320 (2008).
29. Hoofnagle, supra note 22, at 637.
30. Scott Shane, Shifting Mood May End Blank Check for U.S. Security
Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2012, at A1.
31. LexisNexis Accurint for Law Enforcement, LEXIS NEXIS (2011), http://
www.lexisnexis.com/government/solutions/literature/accurintle_ss.pdf.
32. Robert Gellman & Pam Dixon, Data Brokers and the Federal Government: A New Front in the Battle for Privacy Opens, WORLD PRIVACY FORUM 1,
11 (2013), http://www.worldprivacyforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/
WPF_DataBrokersPart3_fs.pdf.
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These third parties include creditors, landlords, and employ33
ers. Employers are required to obtain specific, written consent
from their employee or job candidate before requesting their
34
credit information from a CRA. While CRAs may be considered privacy merchants, they make up only a small fraction of
that industry; however, other privacy merchants are subject to
the provisions of the FCRA, to the extent that they provide personal information used in “making eligibility decisions affecting
35
consumers.” HIPAA limits direct access to a substantial part
of health information, though privacy merchants still collect
data on “over the counter drug purchases; whether the individual purchased disability insurance; purchase history or interest
in various health topics like medicine preferences and diabetes
36
care; ailment and prescription online searches.” The GrammLeach-Bliley Act (GLBA) requires financial institutions to
clearly display their privacy policies, and requires them to take
appropriate measures to “safeguard” private financial infor37
mation from unauthorized disclosure. The Act also limits the
extent to which these institutions can share select types of personal information with a list of third parties, and gives consumers the right to opt out of having their information shared
38
in such cases. However, privacy advocates describe GLBA’s
protections as minimal and note that opt-out provisions put the
39
burden of protecting privacy on the consumer. No federal law
gives individuals the right to learn what information privacy
merchants collect on them. Individuals have no way to opt out
of having their information collected or analyzed, or take action
to remove their information from privacy merchants’ records,
40
even if that information is inaccurate or outdated. Outside of
33. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1968).
34. Id.
35. Data Brokers and “People Search” Sites, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/data-brokers-and
-people-search-sites (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
36. Erin McCann, FTC Calls Out Health Data Brokers, HEALTHCARE IT
NEWS (May 28, 2014), http://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/ftc-calls-out
-dealth-data-brokers.
37. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809 (1999).
38. In Brief: The Financial Privacy Requirements of the Gramm-LeachBliley Act, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2002), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
business-center/guidance/brief-financial-privacy-requirements-gramm-leach
-bliley-act.
39. Financial Privacy, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 5, 2016),
https://www.privacyrights.org/consumer-guides/financial-privacy#3.
40. Data Brokers and “People Search” Sites, supra note 35.
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the areas covered by statutes such as FCRA, privacy merchants
are “largely unregulated for privacy” and “generally free to sell
information as they please with little regard for accuracy, cur41
rency, completeness, or fairness.”
Privacy merchants that supply information to the government benefit from the Third Party Doctrine. According to this
doctrine, once a person voluntary releases information to another party—say by purchasing a consumer good online, making a deposit in a bank, a phone call—this party can share this
42
information with the government. It is no longer private. Specifically, the Supreme Court has held that individuals have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in their bank and telephone
call records, respectively, setting the precedent that those who
“voluntarily conveyed” records to third parties “assumed the
43
risk” that their confidentiality would be violated. Since the
1970s, developments in communications and information technology, including the rise of the Internet and the digitization of
many goods and services, expanded the personal information
individuals share with third parties. As such, these developments have increasingly rendered the Third Party Doctrine a
major gap in Fourth Amendment privacy protections. Because
“virtually all information obtained through data mining comes
from third party record holders—either the government itself,
commercial data brokers, or a commercial entity like a bank—
44
its acquisition does not implicate the Fourth Amendment.”
Such a work-around using the Third Party Doctrine “allows the
government to access information without any federal constitu45
tional restraint.” Moreover, “following the attacks of September 11 there has been a dramatic increase in government access
46
to third-party information.”
Not only does government business with data brokers not
evoke the Fourth Amendment, but it is largely unregulated by
statute. Christopher Slobogin, who has focused intensively on
41. Gellman & Dixon, supra note 32, at 10.
42. Richard M. Thompson, The Fourth Amendment Third-Party Doctrine,
CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 2 (June 5, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43586
.pdf.
43. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979); United States v. Miller,
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
44. Slobogin, supra note 28, at 330.
45. Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment: Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34
PEPP. L. REV. 975, 982 (2007).
46. Id.
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the Fourth Amendment, argues that unlike direct physical or
electronic surveillance by law enforcement, there is far less
regulation of what has been called “transaction surveillance,”
47
the acquisition by the government of already existing records.
Even when the government seeks information directly from the
original third party, federal law on transaction surveillance vir48
tually never requires a warrant. Rather, transaction surveillance at most requires a subpoena, typically based on the lax
standard of “relevance” to an investigation, and in other cases a
certification order or extrajudicial certification, which Slobogin
49
argues are rubber stamps. If instead the government obtains
the same information from a privacy merchant rather than
from the original third party source, such as a phone company,
it does not need even a subpoena. As a result, the aforementioned privacy restrictions can easily be circumvented. For example, the Privacy Act has an exception for law enforcement
(although a written request is still needed to obtain information
from another government agency), and at any rate does not apply to records held by the private sector. Even beyond the Privacy Act’s explicit exceptions, if the government “obtains personal information from commercial data brokers but keeps the
information outsourced and does not maintain that information
in a government system of records,” the Privacy Act “imposes
few or no privacy constraints on federal agencies, and no con50
straints at all on the commercial data brokers.” Likewise,
while a subpoena is needed for law enforcement to access medical or financial information covered by HIPAA or FCRA, respectively, the government does not need a subpoena to acquire
51
that information from a privacy merchant.
In short, the fact that the government can readily circumvent whatever limitations are in place on its surveillance of individuals by purchasing the information from privacy merchants raises the question: has the nation in effect sought to
abolish privacy, or must the nation find new ways to limit the
information privacy merchants can amass and above all, what
they can share with the government?

47. Slobogin, supra note 8, at 141.
48. One exception is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act’s treatment of communications records stored for fewer than 180 days. Id. at 141.
49. Id. at 153.
50. Gellman & Dixon, supra note 32, at 4–5.
51. Slobogin, supra note 8, at 161.
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D. SUGGESTED REMEDIES
The following analysis examines four different types of
possible regulations to remedy privacy concerns arising from
the activities of privacy merchants. First, regulations requiring
consent are discussed, followed by an examination of regulations aimed to specifically protect information classified as sensitive. The analysis then turns to regulations limiting what
private parties may collect, regardless of the sensitivity of the
data. Finally, regulations that limit the data the government
can obtain from privacy merchants are discussed.
1. Require Prior Consent
A major suggestion to deal with the issue at hand builds on
the assumption that people own information about themselves
and hence every secondary use should require the user to gain
the consent of the “owner.” That is, in effect, the position the
European Union takes with its Data Protection Directive
(DPD). DPD asserts that any secondary use of personal information released by a person or collected about him or her requires the explicit a priori approval of the original individual
“owner” of the information, and that granting this consent can52
not be delegated to an agent or machine. If such a rule were to
be fully heeded, research would suffer greatly because of the
great costs involved in seeking consent and the difficulties of
securing a representative sample. Security would be hindered
by having to ask for consent of those one needs to put under
surveillance. And, given that such information is used many
times a day, people would have to spend good part of their day
reviewing requests for consent for such information use.
The European DPD hence provides a considerable number
of exceptions to the consent, including for “journalistic purposes
or for artistic or literary expression.” It also allows national
laws to add additional exceptions for reasons of national security, law enforcement, or “protection of data subjects and the
53
rights and freedom of others.” Moreover, the DPD is not

52. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J.
(L 281) 31.
53. EUR. COMM’N, Exceptions to Data Protection Rules, http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/individuals/exceptions/index_en.htm (last visited Nov.
14, 2016).
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strongly or consistently enforced in those areas that are not ex54
empted.
2. Protect Sensitive Information
Sensitive information is defined as personal information
whose disclosure violates a significant prevailing societal
55
norm. Much personal information is in effect already ranked
by law as if the level of sensitivity were being taken into account. Thus, collecting and reusing medical information in the
U.S. is highly controlled, as it is considered particularly sensitive (and within that, information on HIV status is even more
regulated); financial information is somewhat less sensitive—
and less regulated; and non-sensitive information (such as purchases of most consumer goods) is much less regulated. To
complete this approach, all remaining kinds of personal information would have to be regulated according to their level of
sensitivity. For example, the American Bar Association’s
Standards Governing Government Access to Third Party Records argues that government access to third party information
should depend on whether the information is “classified as
highly private, moderately private, minimally private, or not
56
private.” Another approach would be to regulate government
access to third party data according to the amount of information collected, such as imposing greater restrictions on obtaining data about activities over a period of time greater than
57
48 hours.
Special restrictions have been imposed on secondary use
and could be extended. For example, HIPAA designates as
“Protected Health Information” any personally identifiable
health information that relates to an individual’s medical condition or to their purchase and receipt of healthcare services,
and mandates that “covered entities” such as doctors, hospitals,
54. EUR. COMM’N, Comparative Study on Different Approaches to New
Privacy Challenges, in Particular in the Light of Technological Developments
1, 15 (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/studies/new_
privacy_challenges/final_report_en.pdf.
55. AMITAI ETZIONI, PRIVACY IN A CYBER AGE: POLICY AND PRACTICE 8
(2015).
56. AM. BAR ASS’N, Law Enforcement Access to Third Party Records
Standards (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/
standards/law_enforcement_access.html.
57. Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of United States v. Jones: A
Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, 8 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL.
1, 22 (2012).
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and insurance companies do not use or disclose such information improperly (for example, by selling it to privacy mer58
chants). Likewise, the GLBA requires financial institutions to
maintain the “security and confidentiality” of personal and financial information such as “names, addresses, and phone
numbers; bank and credit card account numbers; income and
59
credit histories; and Social Security numbers.” However, this
approach is limited in the era of “Big Data” by the fact that privacy merchants can often deduce such information through
60
analysis of other publicly available information. For example,
retailer Target was able to use predictive analytics to determine whether its customers were pregnant by analyzing their
purchases, assigning a “pregnancy prediction” score and accu61
rately estimating the stage of a customer’s pregnancy. These
scores were used for marketing purposes, with those determined likely to be pregnant sent coupons. However, in at least
one case, a customer’s privacy was violated when her pregnancy was revealed to her father without her consent through such
62
marketing. For this approach to work, Congress would have to
ban using insensitive information to ferret out sensitive infor63
mation.
3. Limit the Information Private Parties Can Collect, Whether
or Not It Is Sensitive
Several such restrictions are already in place, although
critics argue that they have not kept pace with advances in
technology. For example, the FCRA regulates CRAs, which sell
information about people’s residential and tenant history, employment history, and insurance claims to entities such as a

58. U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 9.
59. Financial Institutions and Customer Information: Complying with the
Safeguards Rule, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2006), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/
business-center/guidance/financial-institutions-customer-information
-complying.
60. Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, FED.
TRADE COMM’N 1, 14 (May 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade
-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
61. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N. Y. TIMES
MAG. (Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping
-habits.html.
62. Dennis D. Hirsch, That’s Unfair! Or Is It? Big Data, Discrimination
and the FTC’s Unfairness Authority, 103 KY. L.J. 345, 350–51 (2014–2015).
63. See ETZIONI, supra note 55, at 11–12, 32–34.
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landlords and employees. CRAs must provide an accessible
means for consumers to find out what information the agencies
have about them and if it has been used against them. Consumers may challenge the accuracy of that information and
have inaccurate information deleted. Above all, CRAs may only
65
sell such information to those with a “valid need.” Although
this rule may deter privacy merchants from selling consumer
data too broadly, it has little relevance to government purchases of data, as law enforcement officials have long been exempt
from these protections for counterintelligence and terrorism investigations, and law enforcement access to credit reports was
66
broadened by the Patriot Act.
4. Limiting Government Purchasing Power
A broader shift in privacy law, either by the Supreme
Court or Congress, should constrain government purchases of
67
information from privacy merchants. These might include requiring data brokers “to inform Congress whenever they dis68
close information to law enforcement . . . .” Another proposed
solution would be for the Supreme Court to overturn the Katz
“expectations of privacy” doctrine, or reinterpret it to account
for society’s “actual” expectations of privacy by removing the
69
Third Party Doctrine. Joshua L. Simmons argues that the
“courts should refuse to treat disclosure” to data brokers that
provide information to the government—which he terms
“fourth parties”—as “corrosive to an individual’s expectation of
privacy.” Instead, courts should “apply the same requirements
to the government in accessing the information from a fourth70
party as they would from a third party.” Likewise, he argues
that “courts must recognize that fourth-parties are agents of

64. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
65. A Summary of Your Rights Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, FED.
TRADE COMM’N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0096-fair-credit
-reporting-act.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
66. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), supra note 6.
67. Joshua L. Simmons, Buying You: The Government’s Use of FourthParties To Launder Data About “The People,” 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950,
982–95.
68. Id. at 1000 (citing Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: PrivatePublic Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CAL. L. REV. 901, 902
(2008)).
69. Sam Kamin, The Private Is Public: The Relevance of Private Actors in
Defining the Fourth Amendment, 46 B.C. L. REV. 83, 89 (2004).
70. Simmons, supra note 67, at 1004.
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the government, and as such, their searches cannot be excused
71
by the private party search doctrine.”
Another means to accomplish this goal would be for government agencies to restrain themselves from using privacy
merchants to bypass the constitutional restrictions on their information collection. For example, the Office of Management
and Budget’s Do Not Pay Initiative relies on privacy merchants
to verify eligibility for government benefits and payments. The
Initiative requires the privacy merchants involved to uphold
privacy standards including some normally applicable only to
the government, notably the requirement that any database
used may not include “records about the exercise of rights pro72
tected by the First Amendment.” However, this very narrow
example is not representative of government use of privacy
73
merchants as a whole, and as with “self-regulation” in the private sector, this approach has the advantage of being flexible
and not requiring new legislation, but the disadvantage of lacking an mechanism for outside oversight and enforcement.
5. Final Thoughts
In short, there is no lack of suggestions of ways to prevent
the government from drawing on privacy merchants to circumvent constitutional or legislative restrictions on its access to
personal information. However, these suggestions have not
been implemented and several of them would exact high costs
and/or would not protect privacy well. It seems that a profound
rethinking is called for of the public/private divide and the major legal assumptions that it entails. This Article returns to this
subject after two more “case studies,” dealing with the same
general subject, are introduced.
II. PUBLIC SAFETY AND PRIVATE POLICE
The number of private police has surpassed that of public
police, yet private police are not held to the same standards
and, furthermore, they are accountable to their employers rather than to the public. The use of private police has dangerous
implications for public safety and privacy. For example, there is
often a lack of oversight with regard to the use of firearms by
private police, a clear public safety concern. And the govern71. Id.
72. Gellman & Dixon, supra note 32, at 5.
73. Id. at 11.
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ment has used private police as a way to exploit loopholes in
the constitutional protections afforded to citizens.
A. WHAT IS THE SCOPE OF THE PRIVATE POLICE SECTOR?
Citizens who are otherwise occupied may well assume that
public safety, keeping people safe in their home and in public
spaces, is the mission of the police. And one may note, that in
some cases, they may be backed up by other state-level agencies, such as a State Bureau of Investigation, or—in extreme
situations—the National Guard. In select cases, the FBI as a
federal agency also can be activated. Actually, the role of the
private sector in public safety has grown dramatically over the
last few decades. The private police sector—those hired,
trained, armed, and commanded by private parties ranging
from corporations to neighborhood associations—has grown so
much in the U.S. that it is now much larger than the public police.
Private police in the U.S. include security guards (whether
employed by security companies or directly by the companies to
which they provide security), private detectives, and body74
guards. Street policing and prison management, while typically associated with the state, are also contracted out to or sup75
plemented by the private sector.
While in the 1970s there were 1.4 private police for every
public police officer, by the 2000s there were three private police for every public police officer, and four private police for
76
every public police officer in California. As for security guards
in particular, estimates range from 1.5 to 2 of them for every
77
public police officer. Given that there were “more than
74. The U.S. Department of Justice recently announced that it will phase
out the use of private prisons. See Charlie Savage, U.S. To Phase Out Use of
Private Prisons for Federal Inmates, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www
.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/us/us-to-phase-out-use-of-private-prisons-for-federal
-inmates.html?_r=0.
75. This essay uses the definition put forward by Elizabeth Joh of this
“private police” industry as “lawful forms of organized, for-profit personnel
services whose primary objectives include the control of crime, the protection
of property and life, and the maintenance of order.” See Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 573, 577 (2005).
76. Id. at 586; see also JAMES F. PASTOR, THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLICE IN
AMERICA: AN ANALYSIS AND CASE STUDY (2003) (chronicling the growth of the
private police force in the U.S.).
77. David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165, 1174
(1999); Shoshana Walter & Ryan Gabrielson, America’s Gun-Toting Guards
Armed with Poor Training, Little Oversight, REVEAL (Dec. 14, 2014), https://
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900,000 sworn law enforcement officers” serving in the U.S. as
of late 2014, the above ratios would put the number of private
police in the U.S. at 2.7 million, and the number of security
guards at 1.35 to 1.8 million (some sources count “1 million
78
plus” security guards).
In addition to employing more people, the domestic private
security industry also spends more than public police agen79
cies. The most recent major study of the industry put the size
of the private sector domestic security industry at $282 billion
(in addition to $69 billion on federal spending, for a total of
80
$350 billion). This report estimated that there were “between
1.9 and 2.1 million” full-time security workers in the United
States as of 2013, and that industry spending is growing rapid81
ly, at 5.5 percent per year in 2013.
B. ACCOUNTABILITY
Private police provide a major way to circumvent the
standards, oversight, and accountability to which public police
are subjected. This is not to argue that all or even most private
police are retained for this purpose. Nor does it mean that the
public police are subject to sufficient accountability. Much national attention has recently been paid to abuses by the public
police, particularly the number of people killed by police, and
the fact that a highly disproportionate number of those killed
82
have been unarmed African Americans. However, while accountability measures to curb abuses by public police are heavi-

www.revealnews.org/article/americas-gun-toting-security-guards-may-not-be
-fit-for-duty.
78. JOHN S. DEMPSEY, INTRODUCTION TO PRIVATE SECURITY 66–67 (2010).
79. Joh, supra note 75, at 1283.
80. Groundbreaking Study Finds U.S. Security Industry To Be $350 Billion Market, ASIS INT’L (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.asisonline.org/News/
Press-Room/Press-Releases/2013/Pages/Groundbreaking-Study-Finds-U.S.
-Security-Industry-to-be-$350-Billion-Market.aspx. However, that number included IT-related spending, which made up 40 percent of the total. Id.
81. Id.
82. See, e.g., Jon Swaine et al., Black Americans Killed by Police Twice as
Likely To Be Unarmed as White People, THE GUARDIAN (June 1, 2015), https://
www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/01/black-americans-killed-by-police
-analysis.
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83

ly criticized for being insufficient, related institutions are at
84
least in place and can usher in reforms.
At the level of individual police departments, police chiefs
have spearheaded major reforms of their departments, such as
William J. Bratton’s reforms of the Los Angeles Police Depart85
ment during the 1990s. In addition, public police departments
have internal affairs units and are subject to civilian review
boards such as the Chicago Police Board and the New York Po86
lice Department’s Civilian Complaint Review Board. Mayors
and city councils have also launched police reform, sometimes
at the urging of grassroots campaigns or NGOs. For example,
the Community Safety Act in New York City, which curbed racial profiling, was passed by the New York City Council in 2014
with the support or endorsement of dozens of local organiza87
tions. Independent commissions have also initiated police reform, for instance the Christopher Commission, which also es88
tablished an Inspector General position in Los Angeles. On
the state level, state legislatures can promote reforms, as Con89
necticut did in June 2015. The judiciary can also impose some
83. See, e.g., Chase Madar, Why It’s Impossible To Indict a Cop, THE NA(Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.thenation.com/article/why-its-impossible
-indict-cop.
84. Robert C. Davis et al., The Public Accountability of Private Police: Lessons from New York, Johannesburg, and Mexico City, 13 POLICING & SOC’Y
197 (2003).
85. Jack Leonard & Richard Winton, Will Bratton’s Reforms Survive After
His Departure?, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/
aug/06/local/me-legacy6.
86. Martin Kaste, Police Are Learning To Accept Civilian Oversight, But
Distrust Lingers, NPR (Feb. 21, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/02/21/
387770044/police-are-learning-to-accept-civilian-oversight-but-distrust
-lingers.
87. See The Community Safety Act, COMMUNITIES UNITED FOR POLICE
REFORM, http://changethenypd.org/community-safety-act (last visited Nov. 14,
2016).
88. Office of the Inspector General, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, http://www
.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/1076 (last visited Nov.
14, 2016); Los Angeles: The Christopher Commission Report, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, https://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports98/police/uspo73.htm (last visited
Nov. 14, 2016); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, The President’s Task Force on
21st Century Policing Implementation Guide: Moving from Recommendations
to Action (2015), http://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/Implementation_Guide.pdf;
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015), http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/taskforce_
finalreport.pdf.
89. Samantha Schoenfeld, Legislature Passes Police Body Cam Law, Malloy’s “Second Chance Society” Legislation, FOX61 (June 29, 2015), http://fox61
.com/2015/06/29/legislature-passes-police-body-cam-law-malloys-second
TION
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reforms, for example by ruling that select police policies are un90
91
constitutional or by ordering changes in police practice. On
the federal level, the Justice Department maintains a Civil
Rights Division that investigates allegations of police civil
92
rights abuses and demands reforms. In the event that a police
department displays a pattern of abusive behavior, the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 allows the
federal government to either formally pursue a federal civil
rights lawsuit or to pressure the department in question to accept a “consent decree,” imposing reforms to be overseen by an
independent monitor and with involvement from community
93
stakeholders.
Some of these institutions have much less legal authority
and effective power over private police and others do not apply
at all. There are no federal training standards for private police. No state even “comes close to meeting the training standards recommended by the country’s largest membership group
94
for security guards.” Many states allow armed private guards
to carry guns without firearms training, do not require them to
undergo mental health examinations, do not check if they are
under court order not to carry weapons, and do not require
95
them to report the use of their weapons. The same is true for a
majority of states with regard to “proprietary guards,” those
employed by the guarded company rather than by a separate
96
security company.

-chance-society-legislation.
90. Joseph Goldstein, Judge Rejects New York’s Stop-and-Frisk Policy,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2013, at A1.
91. Jim Salter, Ferguson Municipal Judge Announces Sweeping Changes,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/
20150824/us--ferguson-municipal-court.
92. Justice Department Announces Findings of Two Civil Rights Investigations in Ferguson, Missouri, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUB. AFFAIRS
(Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces
-findings-two-civil-rights-investigations-ferguson-missouri.
93. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796; Joe Domanick, Police Reform’s Best Tool: A Federal Consent Decree, CRIME REP. (July 15, 2014), http://thecrimereport.org/
2014/07/15/2014-07-police-reforms-best-tool-a-federal-consent-decree.
94. Walter & Gabrielson, supra note 77; see also Lauren Kirchner, The
Surprisingly Lax Oversight of the Security Guard Industry, PAC. STANDARD
(July 1, 2014), https://psmag.com/the-surprisingly-lax-oversight-of-the-security
-guard-industry-1b3e5f9a7d83#.mcfufvpom.
95. Walter & Gabrielson, supra note 77.
96. Id.
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A 2010 report warned that “leaders in the industry remain
concerned about the nation’s ability to provide qualified, welltrained private security officers” and that “proprietary guards
receive very little oversight and typically follow whatever
97
standards are established by their employers.” Shooting incidents involving private police are underreported and underinvestigated relative to those involving public police, often with
no action being taken until an incident makes its way through
98
the criminal justice system.
Private police are accountable to their employer, not the
public. Some have warned that “interests of private parties will
rarely, if ever, be fully aligned with public interests,” and that
in order to “safeguard justice, equity, and quality of service”
and the “public interest” as the trend towards private security
moves forward, “governments must develop the capacity to
99
regulate, audit and facilitate the restructuring of policing.”
This is because “private police are not subject to the same formal and legal systems of accountability that govern public police agencies,” including the obligation to inform public authorities of crimes, yet “they may carry weapons, use force, detain
suspects and intrude on the privacy and rights of individuals.”
Such a situation of unaccountable policing may become “inher100
ently dangerous to society.” Private police are not accountable
to criminal procedure law and are “disengaged from the moral
underpinnings of the criminal law,” whereas public police typically swear to uphold the “public trust.” Furthermore, private
police “stress preventive means over detection and apprehension,” and are linked to “private justice systems” that deter and
punish wrongdoing by “banning, firing, and fining” property of101
fenders such as shoplifters or trespassers.

97. Kevin Strom et al., The Private Security Industry: A Review of the Definitions, Available Data Sources, and Paths Moving Forward 8-1, RTI INT’L
(Dec. 2010), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/232781.pdf.
98. Shoshana Walter, Shootings by Security Guards Rarely Reported, Let
Alone Investigated, REVEAL (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.revealnews.org/article/
shootings-by-security-guards-rarely-reported-let-alone-investigated.
99. Malcolm K. Sparrow, Managing the Boundary Between Public and
Private Policing, NEW PERSPECTIVES IN POLICING 8 (2014), https://www.hks
.harvard.edu/content/download/67532/1242938/version/1/file/
ManagingBoundariesPolicing.pdf.
100. Id. at 9.
101. Elizabeth E. Joh, The Paradox of Private Policing, 95 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 49, 62–63 (2004).
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Private police are often used, especially in gated communi102
ties, to discriminate against minorities. This point has also
been made about public police and the criminal justice system
more broadly, due to abuses such as discriminatory sentencing
103
However,
and racially-biased “stop-and-frisk” policing.
whereas public police are at least supposed to serve the whole
public, and—to reiterate, the mechanism for accountability and
104
reform are at least in place and sometimes used —critics of
private policing argue that the industry’s rise represents a
more explicit move towards a two-tier justice system. At least
one study, for example, has found that among developed countries, reliance on private security correlates with the Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality, with the U.S. high and increas105
ing on both counts. Likewise, other analyses of demographic
and policing data show that “racial threat and economic inequality” better explain the prevalence of private police locally
106
than the serious crime rate.

102. See, e.g., Angel M. Traub, The Wall Is Down, Now We Build More: The
Exclusionary Effects of Gated Communities Demand Stricter Burdens Under
the FHA, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 379 (2000); Richard Damstra, Don’t Fence
Us Out: The Municipal Power To Ban Gated Communities and the Federal
Takings Clause, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 525 (2001); CLIFFORD D. SHEARING &
PHILLIP C. STENNING, PRIVATE SECURITY AND PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF THE 80S: A REVIEW OF THE POLICY ISSUES 9 (1982).
103. See, e.g., Editorial, Racial Discrimination in Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2013, at A22.
104. While the Supreme Court did rule in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services that the government, including public police,
does not have a “constitutional duty” to protect private individuals from each
other, this stems more from the understanding of Constitution as restricting
rather than requiring government action: “the Due Process Clause . . . forbids
the State itself to deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law, its language cannot fairly be read to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those interests do not come to harm
through other means.” 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). By contrast, public police do
commit to actively protect the public. For example, the NYPD mission statement promises “to enhance the quality of life in New York City by working in
partnership with the community to enforce the law, preserve peace, reduce
fear, and maintain order.” Mission, N.Y.C. POLICE DEP’T, http://www.nyc.gov/
html/nypd/html/administration/mission.shtml (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
105. Samuel Bowles & Arjun Jayadev, One Nation Under Guard, N.Y.
TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Feb. 15, 2014), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/02/15/one-nation-under-guard.
106. Stewart J. D’Alessio et al., The Impact of Serious Crime, Racial
Threat, and Economic Inequality on Private Police Size, 34 SOC. SCI. RES.
2267, 2267–82 (2005); see also Rick Ruddell, Matthew O. Thomas, & Ryan
Patten, Examining the Roles of the Police and Private Security Officers in Urban Social Control, 13 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 54, 65 (2011) (“The idea
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Another issue raised by private policing is the fact that it
can be difficult for members of the public to distinguish private
from public police. In some cases, off-duty police officers moonlighting as private police “wear[] their public uniforms and
107
driv[e] their regular squad cars,” wrongly giving the appearance that they are “on duty and available to assist the general
108
public.” At the same time, purely private police often “dress
and act like public law enforcement” and thus wrongly “imply
that they are acting with state authority” within the public
109
monopoly on “state-sanctioned use of force and coercion.” Police companies issue uniforms that are “often indistinguishable
from public police uniforms,” with the result that “private secu110
rity personnel are frequently mistaken for public police.” For
example, one prominent private police force in San Francisco,
the patrol special police, “wear uniforms cut in a different
111
shade of blue with seven-pointed stars instead of six.” Special
Conservators of the Peace, individually designated private police in Virginia, are permitted by law to refer to themselves as
“police” and, “upon request and for good cause shown,” use
112
flashing lights on their vehicles. Statewide Patrol, a Texasbased private police firm, uses this ambiguity as a selling point
for its services, boasting: “Statewide Patrol’s standing guards
project authority, professionalism, and confidence. The look of
our uniform closely resembles those of law enforcement[,] including a metal badge, brass nametag, shoulder patches, and
113
appropriate rank.”
Private police are usually not subject to constitutional limits. The criminal procedure law that restrains public police consists of a “vast set of interrelated constitutional doctrines,” including “the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments, made
of security as a general public good, and not simply an additional resource for
those with economic advantage, should lead to a discussion about the roles of
private security and the police.”).
107. Joh, supra note 101, at 64.
108. Heidi Boghosian, Applying Restraints to Private Police, 70 MO. L. REV.
177, 185 (2005).
109. Id. at 186, 204.
110. Id. at 204.
111. Rachel Swan, The Right To Remain Special: The City’s Other Police
Force Struggles Against Extinction, S.F. WEEKLY (Sept. 18, 2013), http://
archives.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/the-right-to-remain-special-the-citys
-other-police-force-struggles-against-extinction/Content?oid=2827468.
112. See Va. Code § 19.2-13 (2016).
113. About Us, STATEWIDE PATROL, INC., http://www.statewidepatrol.com/
about-us (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
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applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, along with the Supreme Court’s elaborate efforts to implement those provisions through rules of evidentiary exclusion and the restrictions on interrogations im114
posed by Miranda v. Arizona and its progeny.” Private police,
like other private citizens, are restrained merely by “tort and
criminal doctrines of assault, trespass, and false imprison115
ment.” This means in practice that “confessions extracted by
private police without Miranda warnings and evidence obtained through unlawful searches conducted by private agents
116
are not subject to exclusionary rules.” Thus, a move towards
greater reliance on private police threatens to undermine the
civil liberties gained over the twentieth century with respect to
117
public police—as limited as these gains may be.
One explanation for the increasing prevalence of private
police in the U.S. is the emergence of “mass private property,”
such as housing complexes, shopping malls, and university
campuses, with the consequence that “more and more public
118
life now takes place on property which is privately owned.” As
agents of property owners, private police on private property
may have authority that public police lack, such as the “powers
of exclusion or ejection for those considered undesirable or unwelcome from the malls, corporate campuses, and other private
119
spaces that are policed privately.” In other words, the enforcement power of private police in large part relates to exclusion of people from private property, which the Supreme Court
120
views as “central to the private property right.” In this capacity, private police may “complete limited, investigative stops of
individuals on private property” to the extent permitted by
state law, and officers may conduct “routine searches” of any
employee’s “person or property” if required by that employee’s

114. Sklansky, supra note 77, at 1183.
115. Id.
116. Sparrow, supra note 99, at 9.
117. See id.
118. Clifford D. Shearing & Philip C. Stenning, Private Security: Implications for Social Control, 30 SOC. PROBS. 493, 496 (1983); see also Sklansky, supra note 77, at 1229 (discussing the difficulty courts find in treating private
police as state actors); Joh, supra note 101 (documenting the difficulty of discerning the differences between public and private police, a legally critical distinction).
119. Joh, supra note 101, at 65.
120. Id. at 76–77.
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contract. At the same time, when investigating theft, employee wrongdoing, or other matters, private police “commonly
question suspects, interview witnesses, and prepare reports for
litigation,” without the obligation to issue Miranda warnings
and, “regardless of the context of the private police interrogation,” with “any incriminating information obtained” being
122
“normally admissible in future criminal prosecutions.” At the
same time, rather than opt to prosecute, private police may in123
stead impose private sanctions such as firing an employee.
There are some exceptions to the immunity of private police from constitutional limits. Section 1983 of the U.S. Code
provides an “action at law” against “every person” who, acting
“under color of” state law, violates a plaintiff’s federal constitu124
tional or statutory rights. Individuals claiming to have been
“detained, harassed, physically abused, or otherwise injured by
private police” may bring a § 1983 action “when the private police act under color of law, for example by acting jointly with local police, by exercising police powers granted by statute or by
the local police, and when private security is provided by off125
duty police in their official uniforms.”
The Supreme Court has “shied away from addressing the
constitutional status of private police” while developing “an
elaborate, notoriously muddled doctrine of state action” with
126
unclear relevance to private police, and the Court has not
provided meaningful guidance to lower courts on the constitu127
tional status of private police. Moreover, public police benefit
from “having a private arm that reports crimes, that may detain and search citizens, and that may even testify in court,
128
admitting evidence that might otherwise be excluded.”
Since the 1970s, public police have increasingly relied on
private security personnel “to obtain evidence that effectively
circumvent[s] constitutional requirements under the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments,” which is a legal loophole “so

121. Stephen Rushin, The Regulation of Private Police, 115 W. VA. L. REV.
159, 179 (2012).
122. Id. at 180–81.
123. Joh, supra note 75.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
125. Jack M. Beermann, Why Do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties Under Section 1983?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 9, 21–22 (2005).
126. Sklansky, supra note 77, at 1229.
127. Joh, supra note 101, at 101.
128. Boghosian, supra note 108, at 186.
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long as a court can find that there was a ‘legitimate private
129
purpose behind the search.’” This practice has been referred
to as the “silver platter doctrine”; it suggests that current law
and “new organizational forms of partnership create incentives
that permit the circumvention of rules meant to constrain pub130
lic police behavior.” Finally, it may be that “the greater the
legal constraints on the public police, the more private police
will be turned to for ‘dirty work,’ sometimes by the public police
131
themselves.”
In short, public police conduct in a considerable number of
cities is subject to criticism and concern. However, there are at
least basic mechanisms in place for oversight, accountability,
and reform. The private police, which often do not operate in
high-crime areas and hence have less opportunity to commit
abuse, are not subject to the same procedural checks as public
police and may be available to carry out the public police’s
“dirty businesses.”
C. WHAT REMEDIES?
Various suggestions have been made as to how to remedy
issues stemming from the extensive use of private police. The
remedies next discussed include restricting the extent to which
police privatization occurs, increasing control mechanisms over
private police, and bringing private police under the umbrella
of constitutional restrictions that currently are applied to public police.
1. Privatization of the Police Could Be Stopped or Rolled Back
While it is worth analyzing how privatization can be better
managed, the U.S. should “rethink how much policing we want
132
to privatize at all.” “[B]ringing public values to private policing” by holding private police to the same regulatory and constitutional standards as public police is possible but impractical, because private entities use private police largely because
they are exempt from meeting the same standards as public po129. Karena Rahall, The Siren Is Calling: Economic and Ideological Trends
Toward Privatization of Public Police Forces, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 633, 647
(2014).
130. Joh, supra note 101, at 116 (emphasis omitted).
131. RICHARD ERICSON, CRIME IN AN INSECURE WORLD 179 (2007) (quoting
Joh, supra note 101, at 115).
132. David Alan Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 45 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 89, 105 (2006).
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133

lice. Thus, little reform has taken place over the decades of
police privatization, “meaningful constitutional protections
against underpolicing do not exist,” and “there is virtually no
political support” for stricter regulation or labor standards for
134
private police. There is likewise scant political support for
ending private police work.
2. More Control of the Private Police
The shift towards private policing could make law enforcement “less egalitarian” but could be managed in part if
“privatization chiefly took the form of government outsourcing,
so that decisions about the allocation of law enforcement re135
sources remained in the public sphere.” Another solution
would require developing constitutional protections against the
unfair or unequal distribution of police resources, although to
date the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the idea of “minimally adequate protection” holding that “[d]ue process limits
government’s ‘power to act’” rather than “‘guarantee[ing] min136
imal levels of safety and security.’” Along similar lines, some
have advocated that public police should accept the need to
work with private police, but must “do their utmost to make
sure that overall provision of security squares with their public
purpose,” and “tak[e] responsibility for the distribution of pro137
tection across society.”
Moreover, “judicial attempts to control private police behavior through the expansion of the state action doctrine would
138
be ineffective at deterring private police misconduct.” Instead, some have called for a legislative, regulatory approach
that would “mandate private police transparency, afford aggrieved parties with an efficient means of redress, and ensure
139
public accountability.” Likewise, “[t]he enormous and largely
unregulated private police industry in this country has flourished” in part due to government “disengagement by failure to
regulate,” and thus that private policing “deserves much more
attention as an institution not wholly private, but public as
133. Id.
134. Id. at 104–05.
135. Id. at 104.
136. Sklansky, supra note 77, at 1281 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)).
137. Sparrow, supra note 99.
138. Rushin, supra note 121, at 159.
139. Id. at 162.
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140

well.” However, “imposition of increased control of private police behavior, if borrowing from criminal procedure law, must
incorporate the understanding” of the significant differences
141
between the two sectors. In this sense, Elizabeth Joh and David Sklansky, two prominent scholars on criminal law, agree
that the private and public police are fundamentally different,
but Joh takes a more positive view of the opportunities this difference presents.
3. Constitutional Restrictions on the Public Police Could Be
Expanded to Cover Private Police
This approach is favored by some, who argue that restrictions stemming from the Bill of Rights “should follow function over form: both official police and private police functioning as arms of the state should be held to constitutional
standards because they have been legitimized, directly or indirectly, by the state, to fulfill a public demand for order and se142
curity.” However, the same approach may not be appropriate
for “private mercenaries who fulfill merely a private demand
143
for force unrelated to communal order and security.” Yet, attempts by courts to address the issues raised by private police
144
are “vanishingly rare.”
4. Final Thoughts
Scholars have suggested various ways to subject private
police to the same oversight and accountability as public police,
the lack of which is often used in effect to circumvent the constitutional restrictions imposed on the public police. However,
these suggestions have not been implemented and several of
them would exact high costs and/or would not protect the public
well. It is hence necessary to profoundly rethink the public/private divide and the major legal assumptions that it en140. Elizabeth E. Joh, The Forgotten Threat: Private Policing and the State,
13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 357, 389 (2006).
141. Joh, supra note 101, at 124.
142. M. Rhead Enion, Constitutional Limits on Private Policing and the
State’s Allocation of Force, 59 DUKE L.J. 519, 553 (2009).
143. Cf. id. at 552–53; see also John M. Burkoff, Not So Private Searches
and the Constitution, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 627, 628 (1981) (“State involvement
with nominally private law enforcers is often pervasive even when it appears
to fall short of an actual agency relationship. This is particularly true when
the unlawful private search and seizure activity results in criminal prosecution in state or federal criminal courts.”).
144. Sklansky, supra note 77, at 1235–36.
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tails. The Article returns to this subject after one more “case
study,” dealing with the same general subject, is introduced.
III. PRIVATE MILITARY CONTRACTORS
Just as many expect “the police” (meaning the public police) to ensure public safety at home, many expect that the military to be responsible for defending the nation against external
threats. Thus, the state is often defined in terms of its “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given ter145
ritory.” Many view this definition of the state as “common
sense” and the “obvious starting point in most investigations” of
146
security and violence. Those who study globalization and nonstate actors “generally assume that coercive power still resides
147
with the state,” and modern development theory views secu148
rity as a “constitutive” state function.
In reality, the private sector conducts much of the business
of U.S. national defense, including the production of military
assets and services and the training of personnel. Of $519 bil149
lion in federal spending on contracts in 2012, the Defense
Department accounted for 70 percent, allocating 56 percent of
its own budget on contracts. Both percentages increased over
the last decade, although federal spending on contracts fell
150
slightly to $445 billion in 2014. The top ten contractors working for the government in 2014 were defense contractors or sig-

145. Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, Speech at Munich University (Jan.
28,
1919),
http://anthropos-lab.net/wp/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Weber
-Politics-as-a-Vocation.pdf .
146. DEBORAH D. AVANT, THE MARKET FOR FORCE: THE CONSEQUENCES
FOR PRIVATIZING SECURITY 1 (2005).
147. Id.
148. See Verena Fritz & Alina Rocha Menocal, Understanding StateBuilding from a Political Economy Perspective: An Analytical and Conceptual
Paper on Processes, Embedded Tensions and Lessons for International Engagement, OVERSEAS DEV. INST. 7, 44 (Sept. 2007), https://www.odi.org/
sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/1979.pdf.
149. Overview of Awards by Fiscal Year, USASPENDING, https://www
.usaspending.gov/transparency/Pages/OverviewOfAwards.aspx (last visited
Nov. 14, 2016).
150. Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget
Office, to Chris Van Hollen, U.S. Senator, (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.cbo
.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/49931
-FederalContracts.pdf; see also Danielle Ivory, Federal Contracts Plunge,
Squeezing Private Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2014, at B1 (showing that
the value of federal contracts awarded to private companies fell by $58 billion
in 2013).
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151

nificantly involved in defense. Private contractors provide vehicles, armor, weapons, transportation, logistical support, and
many other goods and services; make up about a quarter of intelligence workers; and absorb “70 percent or more of the intel152
ligence community’s secret budget.” As with private police,
defense contractors in addition often play a complementary role
to the public military, with roles including protecting diplo153
mats, providing counterterrorism training, and supplement154
ing U.S. military forces abroad. This Part focuses on private
actors that carry out military missions overseas, referred to
from here on as “private military contractors” (PMCs).
A. THE RISE OF MILITARY CONTRACTING
The PMC sector is large and growing both in the U.S. and
internationally. Since the 1990s, the PMC industry “has become global in both its scope and activity,” while at the same
155
time it has showed “unprecedented” levels of outsourcing.
This outsourcing of U.S. military services is exemplified by the
U.S. military’s increasing use of PMCs for “an array of services:
security, military advice, training, logistics support, policing,
156
technological expertise, and intelligence.” While “true global
statistics on private security contractor use do[] not currently
exist,” a comparison of two U.S. military actions gives a sense
157
of the expansion of PMC activity in recent decades. Whereas
in the first Gulf War, the U.S. military hired 9200 contractors,
with a troop-to-contractor ratio of 55:1, the 2003 Iraq War wit-

151. Top 100 Contractors Report, FED. PROCUREMENT DATA SYS., https://
www.fpds.gov/fpdsng_cms/index.php/en/reports/62-top-100-contractors-report3
.html (click the green icon next to “Fiscal Year 2014 v3” and a Microsoft Excel
file will automatically download) (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
152. Robert O’Harrow, Jr. et al., NSA Leaks Put Focus on Intelligence Apparatus’s Reliance on Outside Contractors, WASH. POST (June 10, 2013), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/nsa-leaks-put-focus-on-intelligence
-apparatuss-reliance-on-outside-contractors/2013/06/10/e940c4ba-d20e-11e2
-9f1a-1a7cdee20287_story.html.
153. Case Against Contractors Resurfaces, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2013, at
A17.
154. Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater’s Black Ops, NATION (Sept. 15, 2010),
http://www.thenation.com/article/154739/blackwaters-black-ops.
155. PETER WARREN SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE
PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 9, 16 (2008).
156. Id. at 15.
157. Statistics on the Private Security Industry, PRIV. SECURITY MONITOR,
http://psm.du.edu/articles_reports_statistics/data_and_statistics.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
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nessed U.S. employment of 190,000 contractors by 2011, with a
158
troop-to-contractor ratio of less than 1:1.
The military has increasingly depended on contractors and
159
has relied on them to perform a wider array of functions.
Contracting is theoretically limited by the requirement that
contractors not perform “inherently governmental functions,”
but the Office of Management and Budget defines these in a
circular fashion as “a function so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government
160
employees,” leaving much room for interpretation. The Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act expands this definition,
including functions such as policy determination, “military or
diplomatic action, civil or criminal judicial proceedings,” functions “significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property interests of private persons,” and the management of U.S. govern161
ment employees, funds, or property.
PMCs (also referred to as “PMFs”, or “Privatized Military
Firms”) can be defined as “private business entities that deliver
to consumers a wide spectrum of military and security services,” including “combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, operational support, training, and
technical skills” that were “once generally assumed” to be pub162
lic in nature.
The following discussion focuses on the ways PMCs are
used to circumvent rules that limit the use of the military. Before proceeding two comments are called for. First, to suggest
that PMCs need more controls is not to suggest that the military always conducts itself in an exemplary fashion. However,
as shown in regard to public and private police, in the case of
the military the mechanisms for accountability and reform are
least in place, and often have worked. This is much less the
case for PMCs. Second, the CIA and NSA, whose work as clandestine agencies does not adhere to the same code of conduct
and accountability as the military, raise a whole slew of issues

158. LAURA DICKINSON, OUTSOURCING WAR AND PEACE: PRESERVING
LIC VALUES IN A WORLD OF PRIVATIZED FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4 (2011).

PUB-

159. Id. at 37.
160. KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42325, DEFINITIONS OF
“INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION” IN FEDERAL PROCUREMENT LAW
AND GUIDANCE (2014).
161. Id. at 3.
162. SINGER, supra note 155, at 8.
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similar to those raised by PMCs, but these lie outside the scope
163
of the following examination.
B. PROBLEMS WITH U.S. USE OF PRIVATE MILITARY
CONTRACTORS
Concerns regarding the use of private military contractors
by the United States fall into two categories. First, PMCs generally lack accountability. The contractors have more direct authority over their employees than the U.S. military does.
Hence, the U.S. found itself in a situation where it lacked effective management practices. Second, the measures that do exist
for holding PMCs accountable have lacked consistent and effective application. The result has been serious human rights
abuses committed by PMCs that often go unpunished.
1. Private Military Contractors Are Not Held Accountable for
Abuses
The last decade’s wars in Afghanistan and Iraq witnessed
extensive corruption and serious human rights abuses by
PMCs. While uniformed military personnel were sometimes
held accountable by military courts, PMCs and other contrac164
tors were rarely held responsible for wrongdoing. According
to the bipartisan Congressional Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWC), which issued a series
of detailed reports between 2008 and 2011, the “limited jurisdiction over criminal behavior and limited access to records”
that characterized the PMC sector contributed “to an environment where contractors misbehave with limited accountabil165
ity.” Of the more than $206 billion spent by the U.S. on con163. See, e.g., Simon Chesterman, “We Can’t Spy . . . If We Can’t Buy!”: The
Privatization of Intelligence and the Limits of Outsourcing “Inherently Governmental Functions,” 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1055, 1055–74 (2008); Mark
Mazzetti, Pakistan’s Public Enemy, N.Y. TIMES MAG., April 14, 2013, at
MM30.
164. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN,
112TH CONG., AT WHAT RISK? CORRECTING OVER-RELIANCE ON CONTRACTORS
IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (Comm. Print Feb. 24, 2011), http://www
.wartimecontracting.gov/docs/CWC_InterimReport2-lowres.pdf (“Congress established the Commission on Wartime Contracting to reduce the extensive
amount of waste, fraud, and abuse in Iraq and Afghanistan and in future contingency operations . . . Criminal behavior and blatant corruption sap dollars
from what could otherwise be successful project outcomes and, more disturbingly, contribute to a climate in which huge amounts of waste are accepted as
the norm.”).
165. Id. at 4.
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tracts and grants in Iraq and Afghanistan through 2011, be166
tween $31 billion and $60 billion was lost to waste and abuse.
167
Although some PMCs have been convicted of fraud or bribery,
168
accountability has been generally lacking. While the details
of this wartime fraud and abuse are covered extensively else169
where, it is worth briefly noting some of the abuses committed by PMCs in particular to demonstrate the relevance of their
ambiguous legal status.
Perhaps the most notorious example of abuse of the 2003
Iraq War concerned the Abu Ghraib prison. Amnesty International and media organizations reported that U.S. personnel,
including soldiers and PMCs, had engaged in “systematic
abuse” of prisoners. This included torture, sexual abuse, and
170
interrogation-related deaths. These abuses were largely unpunished; eleven U.S. soldiers were convicted of crimes relating
to the scandal, but these were “were mostly low-ranking sol171
diers and they generally received lenient sentences.” The
PMCs involved in the scandal have evaded even this limited
level of accountability, in part because the Justice Department
172
has abstained from prosecution. A class-action suit by former
Abu Ghraib prisoners against one of the contractors involved,
166. Id. at 1.
167. See, e.g., Recent Criminal Cases, SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR
AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION, https://www.sigar.mil/investigations/
criminalcases/index.aspx?SSR=3&SubSSR=20&WP=Criminal%20Cases; Carlo
Munoz, 2 Soldiers Convicted in Fuel-Selling Scam in Afghanistan, STARS AND
STRIPES (Feb. 18, 2015), http://www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/
afghanistan/2-soldiers-convicted-in-fuel-selling-scam-in-afghanistan-1.330236;
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Two Department of Defense Contractors
Charged in Bribery Conspiracy Related to DOD Contracts in Afghanistan
(Apr. 9, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/244643
.htm.
168. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Working Group on the
Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the
Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N. Doc
A/HRC/15/25/Add.3 (2010).
169. See, e.g., JEREMY SCAHILL, BLACKWATER: THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S
MOST POWERFUL MERCENARY ARMY (2007); DAVID ISENBERG, SHADOW FORCE:
PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ (2008); ROBERT YOUNG PELTON, LICENSED TO KILL: HIRED GUNS IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2007).
170. See, e.g., Iraq: A Decade of Abuses, AMNESTY INT’L 13 (Mar. 11, 2013),
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/MDE14/001/2013/en.
171. Id. at 65; see also Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal Fast Facts, CNN (Mar.
12, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/30/world/meast/iraq-prison-abuse
-scandal-fast-facts.
172. Editorial, Abu Ghraib, 10 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2015, at
A22.
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CACI International, is still ongoing as of 2016, after a series of
contradictory court rulings over the justiciability of the case. In
the most recent ruling, a district court again dismissed the detainees’ claims, on the basis of the “political question” doctrine,
which holds that “courts are not authorized or equipped to resolve certain matters—like some military decisions or aspects
of foreign relations—and must leave them to the other branch173
es of government.” In other words, PMCs working in Abu
Ghraib, who “were involved in many of the very same inci174
dents,” were too close to the military to be prosecuted by U.S.
courts, yet not close enough to be subject to the Uniform Code
175
of Military Justice.
A host of smaller incidents of abuse have gone unpunished.
In 2006, for example, contractors working for Triple Canopy
176
fired on Iraqi civilians “for sport” but were not prosecuted. A
2010 study on the role of contractors in the Iraq war found noted that “[r]eports are plentiful of [PSCs] committing serious,
sometimes fatal, abuses of power in Iraq,” including “armed
contractors taking offensive measures” or behaving “in an unnecessarily threatening, arrogant, or belligerent way,” resulting
in State Department personnel having to “manage the conse177
quences.” Over one-fifth of State Department personnel reported “sometimes” or “often” having “•rsthand knowledge of
178
armed contractors mistreating Iraqi civilians.” Local observers reported that aggression towards civilians was simply part
of PMC’s rules of engagement: “each time they went out they
had to offend locals, forcing them to the side of the road, being
overpowering and intimidating, at times running vehicles off

173. Editorial, Will Anyone Pay for Abu Ghraib?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5 2015,
at A25.
174. Noah Bierman, Few Have Faced Consequences for Abuses at Abu
Ghraib Prison in Iraq, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, http://www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-abu-ghraib-lawsuit-20150317-story.html.
175. Another PMC involved in the scandal, L-3 Services, a subsidiary of
Engility Holdings, settled with the detainees. Iraqis Awarded $5m over Abu
Ghraib Abuse, AL-JAZEERA (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
middleeast/2013/01/2013193300675421.html; Iraq Prison Abuse Scandal Fast
Facts, supra note 171.
176. Sarah K. Cotton et al., Hired Guns: Views About Armed Contractors in
Operation Iraqi Freedom, RAND CORP., NAT’L SECURITY RES. DIVISION 6
(2010), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_
MG987.pdf.
177. Id. at xiv, 29.
178. Id. at xv.
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179

the road, making enemies each time.” While the most egregious incident of abuse by PMCs, the 2007 Nisour Square killings of fourteen Iraqis, did result in a federal judge giving long
180
jail sentences to four security contractors involved, this was a
181
rare exception to the prevailing lack of accountability.
Incidents of this nature are not merely of great concern
from an ethical viewpoint; they also undermine U.S. military
operations. In Iraq, the public perception that contractors operated with impunity led to growing hostility not only towards
182
contractors, but also towards the U.S. military. Public opinion in Afghanistan and Iraq was especially inflamed when contractors were accused of serious crimes but escaped justice due
to the fact that “jurisdiction over contractors is ambiguous, legal accountability is uncertain, and a clear command-and183
control structure is absent,” leading to “intense enmity.” Political scientists working for the National Bureau of Economic
Research found “strong evidence that local exposure to civilian
casualties caused by international forces” in Afghanistan led to
“increased insurgent violence over the long-run,” while a separate study suggested that civilian casualties in Iraq made civilians less willing to share information with U.S. and allied forc184
es.
Although PMCs may be bound by contractual arrangements with a customer, such as the U.S. government, military
officers have no direct control “over a private military contractor” and lack “even the legal authority to order a contractor to
do those services he or she was hired to perform,” with the “duty of disciplining contractors” instead falling “squarely on the
185
contractors’ corporate employer.” In such a situation, military
179. Daniel Luban, Blackwater Pays Price for Iraqi Fire•ght, ASIA TIMES
ONLINE (Sept. 19 2007), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/II19Ak04
.html.
180. Former Blackwater Guards Sentenced for Nisour Square Shooting, ALJAZEERA (Apr. 13, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/4/13/
former-blackwater-guards-nisour-square-to-be-sentenced.html.
181. See, e.g., Human Rights Council, supra note 168.
182. Cotton et al., supra note 176, at 27–28.
183. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN,
112TH CONG., TRANSFORMING WARTIME CONTRACTING: CONTROLLING COSTS,
REDUCING RISKS 30 (Comm. Print Aug. 2011), http://www.wartimecontracting
.gov/docs/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf.
184. Luke N. Condra, et al., The Effect of Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan and Iraq 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 16152, 2010),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16152.pdf.
185. Mark W. Bina, Private Military Contractor Liability and Accountabil-
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officers must rely on “soft control,” “persuasion and horse trad186
ing” to keep contractors in line. According to the Congressional Budget Office, “[t]he military commander has less direct
authority over the actions of contractor employees than over
military or government civilian subordinates” and “limited authority for taking disciplinary action,” as “[t]he contractor, not
the commander, is responsible for ensuring that employees
187
comply with laws, regulations, and military orders.”
Second, the government’s reliance on contractors in overseas military operations far exceeded its capacity to manage
these contractors. The most detailed study on this issue, the final report of the CWC, points to numerous flaws in the contracting process, including the failure of the Defense and State
Departments and USAID to reform their structures, practices,
and cultures in preparation for a heavy reliance on contrac188
tors. As a result, according to the CWC, the operations in Iraq
and Afghanistan were characterized by an “unhealthy overreliance” on contractors, including contracting of “functions
that law or regulation require government employees to perform”; worsening of “risks to mission or other key U.S. objectives”; undermining of “federal agencies’ ability to self-perform
core capabilities”; and a decline in the “government’s ability to
189
effectively manage and oversee contractors.”
Third, this heavy reliance on contractors has troubling implications for democratic and constitutional constraints on the
conduct of foreign policy. Similar to comments made with re190
spect to private police, PMC’s lack of accountability provides
a perverse incentive for future administrations to contract out
“dirty work” such as torture. Use of PMCs can disrupt the balance of powers within the government. For example, “[b]ecause
Congress has less information about and control over the use of
contractors than the use of troops,” using PMCs can “speed policy making and limit the number and variety of inputs into the
ity After Abu Ghraib, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1237, 1242 (2005).
186. Marc Lindemann, Civilian Contractors Under Military Law, 37 PARAMETERS 83, 89 (2007).
187. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CONTRACTORS’ SUPPORT OF U.S. OPERATIONS
IN IRAQ 20 (2008).
188. See generally COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND
AFGHANISTAN, supra note 183, at 2 (providing recommendations in an effort to
rein in the excessive costs and abuses presented by private contractors in Iraq
and Afghanistan).
189. Id. at 19.
190. ERICSON, supra note 131, at 179.
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policy process” and so bypass “some of the constitutionalism
191
said to be key to democratic policy making.” Use of PMCs also
“has the potential to reduce the political costs of using force—
not because most people care less about private soldiers’
192
deaths, but because people know less about them.” In other
words, PMCs allow the government to “circumvent or evade
public skepticism about the United States’ self-appointed role
193
as global policeman.”
For example, as the security situation in Iraq and Afghanistan has remained volatile following U.S. troop drawdowns in
those countries, the U.S. has relied on contractors to bridge the
gap between public statements about only limited troop in194
creases and the actual needs for larger troop increases. As of
2015, in Afghanistan, there were 39,600 contractors supporting
the U.S. training and advising mission, including 14,200 U.S.
citizen contractors, compared to 10,000 U.S. troops. While the
number of U.S. contractors in Iraq fell dramatically after troop
withdrawal from that country, the Defense Department began
in March 2015 to seek additional PMCs to support the U.S. ef195
fort against ISIS. Such deployments allow the U.S. to claim
that it is adhering to a “no boots on the ground” policy despite
placing a considerable number of boots on said ground. This is
an instance of a broader phenomenon of “awarding contracts to
provide services” that make the federal workforce “appear
smaller,” which the Commission on Wartime Contracting refers
196
to as the “shadow workforce.”
191. Deborah Avant & Lee Sigelman, What Does Private Security in Iraq
Mean for US Democracy at Home? 38 (Jan. 24, 2008) (presented at the Burkle
Center, UCLA), https://bc.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/Avant_08.pdf.
192. Id.
193. David Isenberg, Private Military Contractors and U.S. Grand Strategy, INT’L PEACE RES. INST. 5 (Jan. 2009), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/
files/articles/isenberg-private%2520military-contractors-2009.pdf.
194. Seth Robson, In Place of “Boots on the Ground,” US Seeks Contractors
for Iraq, STARS AND STRIPES (Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.stripes.com/in-place
-of-boots-on-the-ground-us-seeks-contractors-for-iraq-1.301798 (quoting Allison Stanger: “In the era of contractors wars, there are many ways to avoid
putting boots on the ground, while committing significant U.S. resources and
actually being very much militarily involved,” and Michael O’Hanlon: “As the
political premium seems always to be placed on how many troops we have
abroad, the pressure to have contractors do as much as possible only grows
. . . .”).
195. Paul McLeary, US Looking for Contractors To Help in Iraq, DEF.
NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2015/03/09/us
-private-contractor-iraq-isis/24654439.
196. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, supra
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2. Legal Accountability Is Fragmentary and Ineffective
While some accountability measures do exist for PMCs
working overseas on behalf of the U.S. government, they have
not been applied consistently or effectively. PMCs may be prosecuted under U.S. law, the domestic laws of another party to
the conflict, or international law. U.S. civilian courts have been
the most effective means of prosecuting abuses committed by
security contractors abroad. For example, the Military Extra197
territorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA) allows federal prosecution
of contractors who are U.S. nationals who commit federal
crimes abroad while working directly for the Department of Defense or an agency “supporting the mission of the Department
198
At least 12 contractors were charged under
of Defense.”
MEJA between its passage in 2000 and 2008, in addition to
three contractors indicted for kidnapping in Iraq in 2008, and
the six Blackwater contractors charged for the 2007 Nisour
199
Square incident in Iraq. U.S. “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction,” on the other hand, limits federal prosecution
for crimes committed within “any facilities run by the U.S.
200
overseas.”
PMCs may also be prosecuted under military law. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) places security contractors “serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field”
under the jurisdiction of military courts during a “time of de201
clared war” or “contingency operations.” Although at least one
Canadian-Iraqi contractor has been prosecuted for assault under this provision, this amendment would likely face a serious
constitutional challenge in the event of a court martial of a U.S.
202
civilian. The Supreme Court has historically prohibited mili203
tary trials of civilians without a declaration of war. The military currently views the UCMJ as an option of last resort for

note 183, at 27.
197. Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, 18 U.S.C. § 212 (2006).
198. 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (2006).
199. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40991, PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN: LEGAL ISSUES 23 (2010).
200. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 50.
201. Id. at 51; see also 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006) (“The following persons
are subject to this chapter . . . . In time of declared war or a contingency operation, persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.”).
202. ELSEA, supra note 199, 25–28.
203. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 50.
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prosecuting contractors, and prefers to defer to the Department
204
of Justice.
Prosecution by U.S. courts offers the best option to hold
contractors accountable for abuses committed overseas. However, large gaps remain in the effectiveness of this option. For
its part, MEJA does not apply to contractors whose work is unrelated to a Defense Department mission, a “significant loop205
hole” according to an Assistant Attorney General, and only
applies to crimes for which the sentence is a year or more.
Moreover, prosecution at a long distance from the site of the alleged abuses has severe disadvantages in and of itself. There is
the expense and “difficulty in gathering evidence from distant
locations days, or even weeks, after the event,” the even more
difficult task of getting foreign witnesses to testify in the U.S.,
and the “language barriers and severe safety concerns” for civil206
ian investigators. Moreover, both these difficulties and the
dependence on PMCs contribute to a “lack of prosecutorial mo207
tivation” to conduct MEJA-related investigations. The Justice
Department acknowledges that there are “significant limits to
[their] ability to prosecute” because any case must focus not only “on the underlying criminal conduct, but also on the scope of
the defendant’s employment, his or her specific work duties,
208
and other jurisdiction-related facts.” Thus, the “legal framework for domestic criminal prosecution” of PMC abuses exists
but “does not work” because “neither civilian nor military pros209
ecutors have thus far done much to enforce these statutes.”
Given the limits of the above measures for ensuring accountability for PMCs, a Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
204. ELSEA, supra note 199, at 28.
205. Peter T. Nguyen, The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act: Past
Legacy and Future Challenges, LAW STUDENT CONNECTION (Aug. 14, 2013),
http://nysbar.com/blogs/lawstudentconnection/2013/08/the_military_
extraterritorial_.html.
206. Katherin J. Chapman, The Untouchables: Private Military Contractors’ Criminal Accountability Under the UCMJ, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1047, 1065–
66 (2010); SCAHILL, supra note 169, at 27–29; see also Marc Lindemann, Civilian Contractors Under Military Law, 27 U.S. ARMY WAR C. Q. PARAMETERS
83, 87 (2007) (showing that there have been few prosecutions of private contractors, noting those who escaped justice after their abuses at Abu Ghraib).
207. See Chapman, supra note 206, at 1065.
208. Statement by Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer of the Criminal Division Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(May 25, 2011), http://www.origin-www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/testimony/
2011/crm-testimony-110525.html.
209. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 43–44.
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210

Act (CEJA) has been repeatedly put forward in Congress that
would “extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction over federal government contractors and employees fielded abroad for serious
crimes committed while employed by any U.S. department or
agency other than the Department of Defense without impact211
ing the conduct of U.S. intelligence agencies abroad.” Howev212
er, previous incarnations of this bill have made little pro213
gress. CEJA has been introduced to Congress seven times
since 2010, but has yet to become law. Opponents have argued
that CEJA would impair U.S. intelligence agencies, as it only
exempts intelligence activity “consistent with applicable U.S.
214
law,” a difficult requirement for intelligence agents to satisfy,
raising the prospect that intelligence and law enforcement
agencies would have to “pay for defense attorneys and risk jail
215
time at the political whim of the Justice Department.” A second option for prosecuting abuses by PMC abroad is through
the domestic criminal justice system of the countries in question. In the two major recent conflicts in which the U.S. relied
heavily on PMC, Iraq and Afghanistan, many contractors obtained immunity from local law through treaty arrangements,
216
Before and following those
largely negating this option.
210. David L. Richards, We Need the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Act, DAVID’S BLOG (Apr. 15, 2015), http://davidlrichards.com/blog/39-we-need
-the-civilian-extraterritorial-jurisdiction-act.
211. The Case for the Civilian Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (CEJA):
Why U.S. Needs To Clarify Criminal Jurisdiction over U.S. Contractors Fielded Abroad, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp
-content/uploads/pdf/CEJA-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
212. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV, R42358, CIVILIAN EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ACT: FEDERAL CONTRACTOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY
OVERSEAS (2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42358.pdf.
213. Overview of S. 1145 (112th): CEJA, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack
.us/congress/bills/112/s1145 (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
214. Grassley: Changes Need To Be Made to Judiciary Committee Passed
Bill, CHUCK GRASSLEY, U.S. SENATOR FOR IOWA (Jun. 23, 2011), http://www
.grassley.senate.gov/news/news-releases/grassley-changes-need-be-made
-judiciary-committee-passed-bill.
215. DOJ Wants Congress To Resolve Legal Issue To Prosecute Civilians
Who Kill, Rape in War Missions, CBS LOCAL (Jan. 31, 2013), http://washington
.cbslocal.com/2013/01/31/doj-wants-congress-to-resolve-legal-issue-to-prosecute
-civilian-contractors-who-kill-rape-in-war-missions.
216. In Afghanistan, contractors as well as U.S. troops affiliated with the
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) gained immunity from Afghan
law through the 2002 Military Technical Agreement. ELSEA, supra note 199.
However, the status of forces agreements relating to Operation Enduring
Freedom, while granting legal immunity to “U.S. military and DOD civilian
personnel,” did not to provide immunity for contractors. See id. Following the
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agreements, there were a few domestic Iraqi and Afghan prosecutions of contractors involved in abuse. For example, Afghan
courts sentenced Bill Shaw, a British contractor who provided
security to the UK embassy in Kabul, to jail for two years for
217
bribery, and Robert Langdon, an Australian contractor in Afghanistan, received a death sentence (later reduced to a twen218
ty-year jail sentence) for murder. An Iraqi court likewise sentenced a British contractor, Danny Fitzsimons, to a twenty219
year prison sentence for murder. However, this option is affected by the fact that many such cases take place in the context of an ongoing military occupation or other security relationships, as was illustrated by the case of the 2009 murder of
contractor James Kitterman in Iraq. Five fellow contractors
were arrested during a joint investigation of the murder by
220
U.S. and Iraqi forces, but were later released due to lack of
evidence against them, after which legal analysts disagreed on
whether the U.S. had violated their due process in cooperating
221
with the Iraqi investigation. During this period, two of the
contractors were transferred to a U.S. base, but remained technically under Iraqi custody, while U.S. and Iraqi officials “offered a series of contradictory and inaccurate statements” as
they tried to make sense of the jurisdictional issues following
the end of contractor immunity under the previous status of
222
forces agreement. Another drawback of relying on host coun-

official U.S. withdrawal in 2014, a Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) mandated that contractors will be subject to Afghan criminal and civil jurisdiction.
Id. In Iraq, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17, which granted U.S.
troops immunity from Iraqi law, also applied to contractors for acts related to
their contracts. This immunity was removed by the 2009 Withdrawal Agreement negotiated between the US and Iraq. See id.
217. Afghan Court Jails Briton on Bribery Charges, OVERSEAS CIVILIAN
CONTRACTORS (Apr. 27, 2010), https://civiliancontractors.wordpress.com/tag/
afghan-anti-corruption-court.
218. Jon Boone, Australian Escapes Afghan Death Sentence After Paying
Afghan Family, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2011/jan/05/australian-escapes-afghan-death-sentence.
219. Sinan Salaheddin, Iraqi Court Gives Briton 20 Years Over Slayings,
WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2011/02/28/AR2011022800820.html.
220. U.S. Contractors Appear in Iraqi Court, Source Says, CNN (June 8,
2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/06/08/iraq.contractors.held/
index.html?iref=nextin.
221. Bill Gertz, Americans Held in Iraq: FBI Violated Rights, WASH. TIMES
(July 20, 2009), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/20/americans
-freed-in-iraq-claim-fbi-violated-due-pro.
222. Nada Bakri, 2 American Contractors Held in Iraqi Investigation Are
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try prosecution is that PMC firms often “operate in institution223
ally weak areas” such as failed states; Iraq and Afghanistan,
for example, are both notorious for flawed and abusive criminal
224
Moreover, as international organizations,
justice systems.
PMC firms can “move across borders or transform themselves,”
225
unlike a national military.
Gaps in U.S. and local law often allow PMCs to escape accountability for abuses they have committed. Few contractors
have been prosecuted for abuses, despite “numerous incidents
226
and contractors are held accountable
of reported abuse,”
227
much less often than the uniformed military. Peter Warren
Singer, one of the nation’s leading scholars on defense, sees the
possibility of legal recourse against security contractor firms as
very slim, for while state militaries have all manner of traditional controls such as domestic and international laws, public
opinion, and internal checks and balances, accountability for
security contractors is diffused and difficult to track, making it
difficult to determine who to hold responsible for illegal ac228
tions.
Finally, PMCs may be prosecuted under international law,
such as through an international war crimes tribunal, although
this option has been basically theoretical to date. International
humanitarian law focuses on conflicts between states, but does
criminalize some human rights violations by non-state actors,
229
including murder, torture, and degrading treatment. Additional Protocol II, which strengthens civilian protections for
non-international armed conflicts, also applies to “organized
230
armed groups.” (The U.S. has not ratified this protocol.) The
Transferred to U.S. Base, WASH. POST (June 15, 2009), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/14/AR2009061402430
.html.
223. SINGER, supra note 155, at 239.
224. Iraq: A Broken Justice System, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Jan. 31, 2013),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/01/31/iraq-broken-justice-system; see also Torture, Transfer, and Denials of Due Process: The Treatment of Conflict-Related
Detainees in Afghanistan, OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS (Mar. 2012), https://
www.opensocietyfoundations.org/reports/torture-transfers-and-denial-due
-process-treatment-conflict-related-detainees-afghanistan.
225. SINGER, supra note 155, at 239.
226. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 54–55.
227. Id. at 57.
228. SINGER, supra note 155, at 210–13.
229. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
230. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
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Genocide Convention and the International Criminal Court’s
Rome Statute also apply to non-state actors, and although the
U.S. has not signed this statute, a country that has could sub231
mit war crimes by PMCs for prosecution. International humanitarian law applies to individuals, but whether it can be
used to prosecute a corporation (such as a PMC firm) is a mat232
ter of debate. International human rights law largely applies
to PMC only to the extent they act as agents of a state. For example, the Convention Against Torture requires some involvement by “a public official or other person acting in an official
233
capacity.” Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is understood to protect against government
abuses, although this may include non-state actors affiliated
234
with a government.
International law has struggled to gain traction in U.S.
courts. The State Action Doctrine, according to which private
actors “cannot be held to constitutional standards unless there
is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the chal235
lenged action,” limits the obligation on contractors to abide by
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II) June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
231. Justin H. Whitten, Note, They’re Getting Away with Murder: How the
International Criminal Court Can Prosecute U.S. Private Security Contractors
for the Nisour Square Tragedy and Why It Should, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD.
L. REV. 503 (2012).
232. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 46; see also William A. Schabas, Enforcing International Humanitarian Law: Catching the Accomplices, 83 INT’L
REV. RED CROSS 439, 453 (2001) (“Prosecutors will of course attempt to pierce
the corporate shell and get at the individuals behind it, and where the evidence is clear this should pose no great problem. ‘Crimes against international
law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be
enforced,’ wrote the Nuremberg Tribunal in 1946. But it may also be of interest to establish the liability of the corporation itself, particularly when it holds
substantial assets that may be subject to seizure and forfeiture. International
law in this area is relatively underdeveloped.”); Benjamin Perrin, Promoting
Compliance of Private Security and Military Companies with International
Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 613, 623 (2006) (“In many national jurisdictions, there are legal barriers to holding corporate clients criminally liable for the conduct of the private security and military companies they
hire. . . . A provision at the international level that would have allowed the International Criminal Court to have jurisdiction over corporate entities was notably rejected during negotiations.”).
233. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
234. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 47; International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
235. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 42 (1999).
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international law, although different cases have used more or
less expansive interpretations of that doctrine. Court rulings
have held that “private persons” and corporations may be held
liable by U.S. or foreign citizens for war crimes according to the
236
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), but the Supreme Court narrowed
237
the scope of the ATS in 2004. District courts have dismissed
torture claims against private contractors on the basis that the
ATS applies to “official” torture—while noting that if the torture had been official, the case would have still been dismissed
238
on grounds of sovereign immunity.
In 2009, the U.S. and sixteen other states signed the
Montreux Document on private and military security companies, agreeing not to “outsource certain functions assigned by
treaty to states parties,” to ensure that “contractors are aware
of their obligations and trained accordingly,” to prevent and facilitate the punishment of contractors’ violations of international law. The signatories also accepted state responsibility for
239
reparations in the case of such violations. Thus, while international humanitarian law and international human rights law
“do provide mechanisms for potentially reigning in some of the
240
worst abuses,” these mechanisms have proven vague and ineffectual to date.
This legal ambiguity also has negative implications for contractors themselves. International law discourages “mercenaries” from involvement in conflict, though it defines this term so
241
narrowly that it does not apply to many PMCs. Moreover, international law does not clearly extend to PMCs the protections
242
afforded to other participants in armed conflicts. Internation236. Kadic vs. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); In re XE Servs. Alien
Tort Litig., 665 F.Supp.2d 569 (E.D. Va. 2009).
237. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); see also Khulumani v.
Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 509 F.3d 148 (2d. Cir. 2007) (limiting the application
of the ATS to instances in which the actor was so closely associated with the
country that the actor was acting under the color of authority or the actor aided and abetted in continuing the international legal violations).
238. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 49.
239. Elsea, supra note 199, at 9.
240. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 43–44.
241. SINGER, supra note 155, at 5, 238; Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609; International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries December 4, 1989, G.A. Res. 44/34, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/44/34 (Dec. 4, 1989).
242. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 41; Laura Dickinson, Legal Regulation
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al law distinguishes between civilians and combatants, with
combatants defined as “members of the armed forces of a party
243
to the conflict,” eligible to “participate directly in hostilities,”
244
and lawful military targets, and civilians defined as ineligible
245
to take part in hostilities but protected from direct attack.
Whether PMCs are civilians or combatants is situational and
246
open to interpretation. This is important because, while combatants that obey the laws of war are entitled to prisoner-ofwar status and the protections of the Third Geneva Convention
247
if captured, civilians who take part in hostilities may face
criminal prosecution by the opposing side for violations of do248
mestic law even if they do not violate international law. In
this sense, PMCs, like terrorists, may be considered “unlawful
combatants” if they engage in combat (although this term is not
249
used in international humanitarian law treaties).
C. REMEDIES TO PROMOTE CONTRACTOR ACCOUNTABILITY
There are various suggestions as to how to remedy this
lack of accountability. The first remedy addressed in this section is legal reform; there is discussion of proposed legislation
pertaining to PMCs considered by Congress. It then turns to
strengthening the current enforcement regime and looks at
suggestions on how to reform contracts between the government and PMCs. Finally, reducing government reliance on
PMCs is discussed.
of Private Military Contractors, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif
Bassiouni, ed. 2008).
243. Rule 106: Conditions for Prisoner-of-War Status, INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter33_
rule106 (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
244. Knut Dörmann, The Legal Situation of “Unlawful/Unprivileged Combatants,” 85 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, 45, 45 (2003).
245. Rule 5: Definition of Civilians, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS,
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter1_rule5 (last visited Nov. 14, 2016); Rule 6: Civilians’ Loss of Protection from Attack, INT’L
COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_
cha_chapter1_rule6 (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
246. Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian Law, INT’L COMM. OF
THE RED CROSS (May 2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc-002
-0990.pdf.
247. Rule 106: Conditions for Prisoner-of-War Status, supra note 243.
248. Direct Participation in Hostilities: Questions & Answers, INT’L COMM.
OF THE RED CROSS (Feb. 6, 2009), https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/
documents/faq/direct-participation-ihl-faq-020609.htm.
249. See Dörmann, supra note 244.
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1. Reform the Legal Status of PMCs
In the U.S., several efforts have been made to close the legal loopholes affecting PMCs, including amending the UCMJ
and MEJA. The aforementioned CEJA has also been introduced
250
to complement MEJA, with the “strong support” of the DOJ.
This bill aims to clarify and expand federal criminal jurisdiction over federal contractors and employees outside the United
States, “supplement rather than replace” existing “provisions of
federal extraterritorial jurisdiction,” and deal with crimes in251
cluding “federal violent, corruption, and trafficking offenses.”
Amending international law to reflect the increasing prevalence of PMCs, (e.g. by expanding or simplifying the definition
of “mercenary”) might be another way to increase accountabil252
ity. However, “if there is to be law reform in this area, it is
important to bear in mind the difficulties with the existing conventional law,” including lax enforcement and the emphasis in
253
international law on the narrowly defined term “mercenary.”
At the same time, most of the bills intended to deal with
PMC abuse and fraud failed to make any headway in Con254
gress. The aforementioned MEJA bill was passed by the
House in 2007, but not by the Senate, and made no subsequent
255
progress. Some provisions from the Comprehensive Contingency Contracting Reform Act of 2012, backed by Sen. Claire
McCaskill and building on the recommendations of the CWC,
were incorporated into the 2013 National Defense Authoriza256
tion Act, but were “watered down over time or cut entirely.”
250. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
to Hon. Patrick J. Leahy & Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Chairmen, U.S. Senate,
Comm. on the Judiciary (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/
files/ola/legacy/2011/11/08/100711-ltr-re-s1145-civilian-extraterritorial
-jurisdiction-act.pdf.
251. CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV, R42358, CIVILIAN EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION ACT: FEDERAL CONTRACTOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY
OVERSEAS (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42358.pdf; see also
Overview of S. 1145 (112th): CEJA, supra note 213.
252. SINGER, supra note 155, at 238.
253. Katherine Fallah, Corporate Actors: The Legal Status of Mercenaries
in Armed Conflict, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 863 (2006).
254. See, e.g., S. 674 (110th): Transparency and Accountability in Military
and Security Contracting Act of 2007, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/
congress/bills/110/s674 (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
255. H.R. 2740 (110th): MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007,
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr2740 (last visited
Nov. 14, 2016).
256. Lindsay Wise, Sen. Claire McCaskill Leaps Hurdles To Overhauling
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While the role of money in politics is difficult to prove, this legislative inertia likely results in part from the influence of military contractors in Washington. Recent consolidation in the de257
the government’s reliance on
fense contracting industry,
military contractors, and the millions of dollars the industry
spends on lobbying all combine to give military contractors
258
substantial leverage to resist reforms.
2. Strengthen the Existing Enforcement Regime
While many experts on PMCs are troubled by their legal
unaccountability, Laura Dickinson, who focuses her studies on
human rights and international security, argues that the legal
jurisdiction for holding contractors accountable is adequate,
and the real problem is the lack of an effective “enforcement regime” for these laws. She thus makes three broad recommendations for organizational reforms. First, she suggests reforming
government contracts with PMCs to include “public law values”
(including human rights norms, norms against corruption and
259
waste, and democratic processes) as well stronger oversight
and enforcement requirements, and the requirement that con260
tractors receive accreditation. Second, she calls for greater
public participation in the design and implementation of such
261
contracts. And third, she suggests “reforming the organizational structure and culture of private security firms,” which
might include a greater supervisory role for judge advocates
and military commanders, as well as the adoption of legal corps
262
and stricter standards within private security contractors.
While Singer is more skeptical of existing legal accountability, he also makes suggestions for reforming the relationship
Wartime Contracting, MCCLATCHY DC (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www
.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/congress/article24743218.html;
Press Release, Sen. Claire McCaskill, Fight Against ISIS Gets Independent
Watchdog as McCaskill’s Wartime Contracting Reforms Kick-in (Dec. 23,
2014), https://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/media-center/news-releases/fight
-against-isis-gets-independent-watchdog-as-mccaskills-wartime-contracting
-reforms-kick-in.
257. Constellis Holdings, Inc. Acquires Constellis Group, Inc., ACADEMI
(June 6, 2015), https://www.academi.com/news_room/press_releases/95.
258. Defense, CTR FOR RESPONSIVE POLS., https://www.opensecrets.org/
industries/indus.php?Ind=D (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
259. Laura T. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31
YALE J. INT’L L. 383 (2006).
260. DICKINSON, supra note 158, at 71–73.
261. Id. at 143–45.
262. Id. at 194.
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between government and PMCs. Acknowledging that PMCs
have proposed various self-regulation schemes, he argues that
the public interest in the nature of their activities necessitates
greater public scrutiny and regulation. Much of his suggested
reforms focus on transparency, including “full disclosure of equity partners and client lists,” “more transparent licensing processes, government oversight over local PMF contracts, and the
establishment of financial and operational reporting require263
ments.” On the international level, he calls for a U.N. task
force and ultimately a permanent international office to moni264
tor and regulate the industry. At the same time, like Dickinson, he sees the need for greater enforcement of existing accountability measures, “a dedicated focus on managing the
relationship to protect the public interest,” greater attention to
the contract-making process, the establishment of “prior acceptable and sound business practices for the contract,” as well
as effective supervision, administration, and enforcement of
265
contracts with strict and immediate punishments for abuse.
For its part, the CWC also puts forward a broad array of
recommendations, including more careful risk assessment prior
to using PMCs, improved resources, authority, and procedures
for acquisition and contractor oversight, increased coordination
among and guidance for government agencies relating to contractors, and more competitive bidding. To this end, the CWC
has also called on Congress to legislate and provide funding for
266
contracting reform.
Scholars on governance and military affairs praise Dickin267
son’s proposed reforms as practical and realistic. NGOs working on government accountability lauded the CWC for reaching
bipartisan consensus on a “broader and compelling argument
for systemic contracting reforms,” and the Commission has had
268
some impact on government contracting practices. For exam263. SINGER, supra note 155, at 239–240.
264. Id. 238–41.
265. Id. at 235–37.
266. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, supra
note 183.
267. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Readings: Laura A. Dickinson, Outsourcing War & Peace, LAWFARE (May 26, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/
2012/05/readings-laura-a-dickinson-outsourcing-war-peace/; An Hertogen,
Book Discussion: Laura Dickinson’s “Outsourcing War and Peace,” OPINIO
JURIS (May 14, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/05/14/book-symposium-laura
-dickinsons-outsourcing-war-and-peace.
268. CWC’s Final Report: Make Investments in Contracting Oversight, CTR
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ple, according to the Government Accountability Office, the Defense Department took or planned to take “actions that directly
align with about half of the CWC recommendations” by August
269
2012, and State and USAID a third of the recommendations.
Even prior to the Commission’s final report, then-Senator
Obama acknowledged that there were accountability issues in
government contracting, broadly speaking, and pledged to sup270
port legislative reform.
3. Reduce Government Reliance on PMCs
It may be wise to simply oppose privatization of security in
general. Outsourcing of “essential or inherent functions” such
as the armed forces and police both undermines the “capacity,
effectiveness, and morale” of government and violates constitu271
tional and democratic principles. Another approach entails
recognizing that PMCs do have some merits, but their use
should be curtailed. This is the approach taken by the CWC,
which argued the U.S. was “over-reliant” on contractors and
should consider reducing their use or the “the number, nature,
and scope of the overseas contingency operations” for which
272
they are needed.
One way to reduce reliance on contractors would be to do so
in particular areas rather than simply call for an overall reduction. For example, Singer argues that due to the lack of full
command authority of military officers over PMCs, “wherever
possible private security contracting should be kept out of critical battlefield areas,” and that “when the military requires a
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269. Contingency Contracting: Agency Actions To Address Recommendations by the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan,
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF. (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO
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service, it should be sure to examine first the possibilities offered within the force, across other service branches, and then
273
to trusted allied forces.” Likewise, the CWC recommended
that the government “phase out use of private security contractors for certain functions,” particularly for guarding convoys or
274
bases that are at risk of attack from enemy forces.
CONCLUSION
The preceding three case studies suggest that the publicprivate distinction, a major normative and legal metaconception that has framed much of public discourse and policy
making over the last two-hundred years, is obsolete. Many of
the statements most commonly made in public discourse about
the government and the market, or the state and individual
rights, view one of these two realms as virtuous and the other
as problematic. Many Americans see the government as coercive and the private sector as the realm of freedom, and hence
hold that the government should be checked and curbed and
the private sector be free to follow its own course. Libertarians
and civil libertarians similarly hold that the government is oppressive and that individual rights must be protected. In contrast, the left sees the private sector—particularly Wall
Street—as the source of major societal deformations and seeks
to use the government to check the private elites and promote
social justice. However, the preceding case studies show that in
at least these three major areas, the two sectors increasingly
act as one, with the private sector carrying out government
missions, and the government using the private sector to circumvent the limits imposed on it. A more accurate conception
would treat American society (polity and economy included) as
one whole, influenced by a set of factors that affect both the
private and the public sectors.
To provide but one more illustration of the extent to which
the old but still-dominant framework is obsolete, take the following situation. In January 2009, the U.S. had about 34,400
275
troops in Afghanistan. The U.S. military asked the White
House to authorize a major increase in the level of troops com273. SINGER, supra note 155, at 235.
274. COMM’N ON WARTIME CONTRACTING IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN, supra
note 183, at 58–61.
275. Alan McLean & Archie Tse, American Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/06/22/world/asia/
american-forces-in-afghanistan-and-iraq.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).
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mitted to this country (known as the Afghan surge). The request was followed by an intensive, months-long debate in the
White House, Congress and the public over how many additional troops to commit. Some called for as many as 80,000,
276
some for as few as zero. The President settled for 30,000, and
277
eventually the troop level peaked at 100,000 in August 2010.
During the debate, however, almost no one mentioned that at
the same time, the U.S. had deployed 74,000 PMCs in Afghani278
stan, many more than the additional troops. In reality, a
larger “contractor surge” occurred over the same period: the
number of contractors increased to 107,300 in December 2009.
Moreover, as the U.S. drew down troop levels in Afghanistan
beginning in 2011, it also undertook a second contractor surge
with little fanfare: the number of contractors, which had fallen
279
to 70,600 in September 2010, rose to 107,800 by March 2013.
This blind spot extends to casualty figures as well. When President Obama spoke in 2015 about the “more than 2,200 American patriots who made the ultimate sacrifice in Afghanistan,”
for example, this did not include the 1,592 private contractors,
thirty-two percent of whom were Americans, who were killed
280
over the same period. A reasonable debate should have encompassed the size of both public and private forces.
Any new approach need not hold that there are no differences between the private and public sector and hence treat
privacy merchants as if they were agents of the NSA, members
of the private police as public cops, and private military contractors as troops. One promising approach focuses on what
might be called the “degrees of separation.” This approach suggests that private actors that are directly controlled by the government, have largely public missions, and are financed by the
public (such as security guards hired to protect American dip-
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lomats) should be treated much more like public sector agents.
In contrast, those who are private actors that mainly serve the
private sector, market their wares to one and all (the government included) and for whom the government is not a particularly large or influential client, should be granted much more
leeway. Those in between these two extremes should be treated
accordingly.
To avoid a misunderstanding: this Article suggests that all
private agents who carry out a government function—directly
or indirectly—should be subject to more accountability and
oversight, of a kind similar to that which public agents are subjected. However, there should be a difference in degree according to the extent that the private actors are autonomous from
the government.
One analogue for the needed approach is the normative
and legal response to the rise of the “on-demand” or “gig” economy, in which companies such as Uber use part-time contracts
for jobs previously performed by employees. Recent court and
administrative rulings have looked at the extent to which the
rules that apply to the traditional employee-employer relationship should also apply to the relationship between on-demand
services and their contractors, based on several different criteria. For example, in June 2015, the California Labor Commissioner’s Office ruled that an Uber driver should be classified as
an employee rather than an independent contractor, because
Uber was “involved in every aspect of the operation” and played
281
a controlling rather than merely facilitating role. Likewise, in
August 2015, the National Labor Relations Board ruled that
companies such as McDonalds that used contractors and franchisees as intermediaries with their workers are still “joint employers” of those workers, which entitles unions representing
these workers to bargain directly with the company as well as
282
the contractor or franchisee.
More broadly, the distinction between workers and contractors “has been the subject of intense legal battles for decades,” resulting in federal agencies designating the criteria that
should be taken into account, with the extent of control usually
281. Berwick v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 11-46739 EK, slip op. at 9 (Cal. Labor Comm’r June 3, 2015).
282. Noam Scheiber & Stephanie Strom, Labor Board Ruling Eases Way
for Fast-Food Unions’ Efforts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes
.com/2015/08/28/business/labor-board-says-franchise-workers-can-bargain
-with-parent-company.html.
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the most important. Thus, the IRS lists three broad categories: “behavioral,” in the sense of whether the company controls
the worker’s performance; “financial,” in terms of whether the
“business aspects of the worker’s job” are controlled by the
company; and “type of relationship,” such as whether there is a
written contract or long-term association and whether the work
284
performed is a “key aspect of the business.” The difficulty of
maintaining a sharp dichotomy between employees and contractors suggests that it would be productive to employ a nuanced approach that involves gradations in employee status
and employer obligations. The same is true for privacy merchants, private police, private military contractors and all other
private actors who carry out missions historically associated
with the government.
When one takes this approach in the context of developing
a new meta-doctrine to replace the private/public sharp distinction, several variables standout as helpful in determining the
degrees of separation between the government and its private
agents. These include:
(a) Command and control. Does the government directly
order the private agents about, daily and in a tight formation,
just like its own troops, or does the government define a mission and contract it out, but let private supervisors control the
actual agents?
(b) Accountability. Does misconduct by the private agents
harm the public as much as would direct misconduct by the
government (e.g. the way enhanced interrogations soiled American reputation in the Middle East and elsewhere), or is that
harm largely absorbed by the private actor (e.g. cost overruns if
charged to the company rather than the taxpayer)?
(c) Financing. Does the government finance the private actor completely or to a significant degree, and hence gain considerable influence over that actor? Or, is the government only one
of the private actor’s many customers, limiting its influence?
Surely other criteria might be developed, but these suggested criteria illustrate the approach that would govern private agents as if they were public ones, with varying levels of
283. James Surowiecki, Gigs with Benefits, NEW YORKER (Jul. 6, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/06/gigs-with-benefits.
284. Independent Contractor (Self-Employed) or Employee?, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self
-employed/independent-contractor-self-employed-or-employee (last visited
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strictness according to the extent they are separated from the
public architecture.
The rise of private contractors in American government
creates a need for new society-wide normative and legal doc285
trines and a fundamental change in Western (and particularly American) thinking. This change is illustrated by the notion
that the Fourth Amendment may apply to private actors and
not just to government agencies. It makes little sense to lock
the door (of the public sector) if one leaves the windows (of the
private sector) wide open. For American society to uphold the
values it seeks to implement, it requires normative positions,
policies, laws and institutions that apply to both sectors. Many
of the remedies listed above are partial. Most are of merit, but
nevertheless do not offer the kind of comprehensive new
framework that the evidence suggests is needed. It will take an
almost revolutionary effort to develop the needed comprehensive meta-conception and integrate it into the policy and legal
286
worlds.

285. For more discussion on this point, see Amitai Etzioni, The Bankruptcy
of Liberalism and Conservatism, 128 POL. SCI. Q. 39 (2013).
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